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Preface 
This collection of papers derives from a public seminar at the Australian 
National University in 2001, intended to provide some commentary and 
discussion on a number of significant events then taJcing place in Melanesia, and 
in the context of growing concern about an emerging 'arc of instability' to 
Australia's north. The collection has subsequently been expanded and updated. 
R.J. May 
Visiting Scholar 
Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies 
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THE MILITARY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: A 
'CULTURE OF INSTABILITY'? 
R.J. May 
In the period from early 2000 to mid 2002, a series of incidents involving the 
Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) has highlighted continuing 
problems within the Force, and once again raised questions about the possibility 
of military intervention in politics. 
Recent unrest and official reviews 
Early in 2000 a group of PNGDF personnel staged an angry protest outside 
Defence headquarters in Port Moresby, demanding a 100 per cent pay rise (they 
eventually received 5 per cent). Then in September that year, on the twenty-
fifth anniversary of Papua New Guinea's independence, disgruntled soldiers of 
the PNGDF's Second Battalion, returning to Moem Barracks in Wewak to find 
there was no food in the mess, went on a rampage, burning down the regimental 
headquarters and officers' mess and causing visiting Papua New Guinean and 
Indonesian dignitaries, at Moem to celebrate the independence anniversary, to 
flee. In a separate incident the following week, soldiers marched on the Port 
Moresby General Hospital to recover the body of a colleague shot dead by 
police following an armed holdup in the national capital; rocks were thrown and 
a police vehicle set alight, and rumours that soldiers were about to march on the 
National Parliament forced the parliament to postpone its session. 
The incidents of September 2000 prompted the creation of a parliamentary 
Ministerial task Force on Defence, chaired by the Defence minister, Muki 
Taranupi, to examine the status of the PNGDF. The Task Force reported in 
October. Introducing the report into parliament, Prime Minister Mekere 
Morauta said: 'the PNGDF and the Defence Department cannot provide the 
protection that the people of Papua New Guinea need'; if hostilities or a 
national emergency occurred, he told parliament, 'a credible force could not be 
mobilised in less than 30 days'. He spoke of a 'culture of instability' in the 
PNGDF, and suggested that the institutional breakdown of the Force was the 
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res~lt of years of neglect and mismanagement. The report itself argued that the 
basic needs of the PNGDF were not being met, that basic management ' 
structures and systems were not appropriate or not working, and that critical 
issues relating to the mission and purpose, capacity, resourcing and structure of 
the Force needed to be re-examined. Prime Minister Morauta foreshadowed a 
'radical overhaul' of the PNGDF and announced that he would ask the 
Commonwealth secretary general for assistance in this. 
In November 2000 a Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (CEPG), headed 
by a former New Zealand defence secretary, Gerard Hensley, arrived in Port 
Moresby to begin its review.1 At the time, there was talk of reducing force size 
fro~ 4200 t~ around 3000 at end 2000 and 1500 by mid 2001. This was broadly 
consistent with recommendations for restructuring of the PNGDF contained in 
defence white papers of 1996 and 1999. Cabinet had in fact approved proposals 
fo~ a smaller force, and a redundancy list had been drawn up (though it was 
being strongly contested). Following talks with the Australian government it 
was announced that Australia would increase its support for the PNGDF under 
the Defence Co-operation Program, in part as a once-off payment to enable the 
PNGDF to pay entitlements owed to soldiers and meet other outstanding debts, 
and cover the costs of downsizing. Australia would also provide up to thirty 
defence advisers. Assistance to the Defence Department was also anticipated 
from the World Bank. 
The report of the CEPG (CEPG 2001) was presented to the government in 
January 2001 . It contained a number of observations about structural imbalance 
~ai~te~ance and supply deficiencies, financial and personnel management, and 
d1sc1plme. It also recommended a dramatic reduction in force size, from 4150 to 
1900 within six months through a Voluntary Release Scheme. 
While the recommendation for cutting force size was not new, extracts from the 
report were leaked before adequate consultation with troops had taken place, and 
after the CEPG report had been accepted by cabinet in March 2001 rumours of 
imminent downsizing generated an angry response. There was particular 
resentment that the reconunendations had come from a predominantly 'foreign' 
group and that Australian influence was present. Within PNGDF' s main base at 
Murray Barracks - where there was already a large number of soldiers who had 
been made redundant but were still awaiting redundancy payments - a group of 
around one hundred soldiers called on the government to reject the 
recommendations of the CECP and to resign, and there were reports of soldiers 
1 
Other members of the CEPG were Major General Michael Jeffrey, an Australian former commander of the 
PNGDF. Jamaican Hugh Small QC, and senior Papua New Guinean bureaucrat Charles Lcpani. 
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breaking into the armoury. The soldiers also called for the removal of 
Australian military advisers. When the Defence minister came to address the 
soldiers he was chased away, and there was some destruction of property within 
the barracks. However, the soldiers did not carry their dispute beyond the 
barracks, despite the urgings of some national politicians, who, with an election 
on the horizon, were keen to discredit the Morauta government, and of student 
activists at the University of Papua New Guinea, who suggested that the soldiers 
join with students and trade unionists in a demonstration against the 
government's acceptance of structural adjustment measures imposed by the 
World Bank. (In a subsequent student demonstration, in June 2001, police fired 
on demonstrators, killing four people.) 
In the event, the dispute was resolved fairly quickly, but only when the prime 
minister agreed to rescind the cabinet decision on force size (though, in fact, the 
downsizing process has continued) and to grant anlllesty to those involved in the 
protest. In a public statement, Prime Minister Morauta said that the proposed 
downsizing had been shelved 'to ensure stability and avoid the issues being 
politicized' (Post-Courier 20 March 2001). 
Less than a year later another, more serious, incident occurred in Wewak, when 
rebellious soldiers, in a further protest about the proposed restructuring, took 
control of Moem Barracks, burning down the communications centre and a an 
administration block which also housed military intelligence, breaking into the 
armoury, and chasing some officers and their families out of the compound. A 
13-point petition presented by the soldiers to then opposition leader Sir Michael 
Somare (a resident of Wewak) included, as well as industrial demands, calls for 
the resignation of the prime minister, and of the commander PNGDF, and 
several other political demands, including a halt to the privatization of 
government assets and proposed land mobilization (see· The National 12 March 
2002). At the time, an editorial in The National newspaper (12 March 2002) 
warned: 'Moem mutiny threatens our democracy'; 'the main aim of the 
rebellious soldiers', it said, 'is the political overthrow of the elected government 
of the day'. On this occasion, after negotiations between the soldiers and a 
PNGDF crisis management team failed to resolve the dispute, the Barracks was 
retaken in a military operation (see The National 25, 28 March 2002) and around 
thirty soldiers were subsequently arrested and face court-martial and civil 
criminal charges. And Prime Minister Morauta reiterated his government's 
commitment to the restructuring of the PNGDF (The National 20 March 2002). 
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Background to the current disputes 
Problems of deteriorating capacity, declining morale, and poor discipline in the 
PNGDF are longstanding. They were highlighted during the Bougainville 
conflict, when the PNGDF not only was unable to contain the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army but was involved in human rights violations and occasional 
confrontation with the civilian government (see, for example, Liria 1993; May 
1997). Successive governments have failed to address the issue effectively. 
In 1988 a Defence Policy Paper proposed a ten-year programme to replace 
major equipment, reorganize force structure and enhance defence capabilities. 
Approval of a Ten-Year Development Plan for the PNGDF did not come until 
1991, however, by which time the Bougainville conflict was well under way. 
This plan provided for an expansion of the Force, to 5200 by 1995. However, in 
1992, without any explicit change in policy, the minister for Finance outlined 
budgetary proposals for the law and order sector which included a scaling down 
of PNGDF force size from 4200 to 2500-3000. For some time, these two 
mutually incompatible policy decisions co-existed without either being 
implemented. In 1996 proposals for a fundamental restructuring of the PNGDF 
were set out in a Defence white paper. These envisaged a smaller, more mobile, 
more highly trained, and better equipped force. Little immediate progress was 
made in the implementation of the 1996 proposals, which were essentially 
endorsed in a revised white paper in 1999.2 
In the meantime, the frustration of the Chan government at the PNGDF's 
inability to achieve a military solution to the Bougainville conflict had resulted 
in the decision to hire military consultants Sandline International, precipitating 
the 'Sandline affair' (see Dinnen, May and Regan 1997; Dorney 1998; 
O'Callaghan 1999). Brigadier General Singirok's defiance of the government 
over the Sandline contract received considerable popular support, and in the 
event gave impetus to the Bougainville peace process. But it also created 
divisions within the PNGDF and had pronounced negative effects in the longer 
term, both in exacerbating existing problems of instability in the office of 
commander (which changed seven times between March 1997 and October 
2001) and in increasing factionalism within the force. After 1997, factional 
splits partly followed a division between those troops who had supported 
General Singirok (particularly the Special Forces Unit which had been created 
under Singirok's command and had spearheaded the action to remove Sandline) 
and those who had not taken part in the Sandline affair (and were associated 
1 For a detailed account see May (1993). the annual reviews in Asia Pacific Security Outlook (Tokyo and New 
York: Japan Center for International Exchange), and papers by Lt. Col. James Laki, in NRI 2000a.b. 
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with the Special Operations Group set up after Singirok's sacking in March 
1997 to restore order in the barracks), but were based primarily on regional 
identities. 
A particular aspect of regional factionalism within the force has been the 
growing resentment among highlanders that the highlands provinces are 
significantly underrepresented at senior officer level. 
In 1997 the PNGDF was deployed to assist police in providing security for the 
conduct of the national election. In the Eastern Highlands, however, troops 
were accused of physically assaulting supporters of the outgoing defence 
minister, Mathias !jape, and in Enga Province several soldiers were arrested on 
charges that they had assisted particular candidates. General Singirok, having 
been removed from command of the PNGDF, had also campaigned for selected 
candidates in the highlands (specifically, a group of candidates, backed by 
Melanesian Solidarity, who had supported Singirok in his opposition to the 
Sandline contract). Consequently, in 2002, amidst talk of the PNGDF's being 
subjected to 'outside influences' (see, for example, The National 15 March 
2002, quoting PNGDF chief of Staff, Captain Ur Tom), it was decided that the 
army would be used in security operations during the national election only as a 
last resort, and troops were confined to barracks with leave cancelled. A change 
in the Defence portfolio, and announced changes in senior PNGDF positions 
early in 2002 (which were deferred after a legal challenge) were also seen as 
attempts to ensure the neutrality of the Defence Force in the lead-up to the 
election. (In April, however, it was reported that Defence Intelligence had 
informed the PNGDF commander, Commodore llau, that these changes were 
'election-related' and evidence of a plot by 'a major political party' to halt the 
retrenchment exercise and change the current conunand structure of the Force 
(The National 23 April 2002; also see The National 29 April 2002, 'Sir Michael 
[Somare] fears election rigging').) 
Notwithstanding these measures, it was reported in June that several soldiers, 
including a lieutenant colonel, had absented themselves and taken part in the 
election campaign. The civilian Defence secretary was also reported to have left 
his office and to have been seen with candidates in the highlands. Several 
soldiers were subsequently arrested in the Southern Highlands and charged with 
electoral offences. In July, as the law and order situation in the highlands 
deteriorated, preventing voting from taking place in much of the Southern 
Highlands (where 'failed elections' were eventually declared in six electorates), 
the PNGDF was deployed to assist the police. 
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The potential for a coup? 
The actions of disgruntled soldiers in September 2000 reflected a serious lack of 
discipline, but had only minor impact beyond the PNGDF itself. The 
confrontation at Murray Barracks in April 2001 was a more serious incident, 
though as I argued at the time, the action of the soldiers could be seen less as an 
'attempted coup', as some were apt to describe it, than as an indusuial dispute. 
Without downplaying the seriousness of any episode in which the disciplined 
forces defy an elected government (and recognizing that military coups are not 
infrequently prompted by soldiers seeking to safeguard their material interests), 
what was salient in April 2001 was that the rebellious soldiers did not go outside 
the barracks, and did not accept the invitation to join students and trade unionists 
in a more broadly-based protest. Their actions in 2001, indeed, were more 
constrained than in 1989, when soldiers marched on the National Parliament to 
protest their disappointment at lower-than-expected pay increases. 
Evidence of links between soldiers and serving or aspiring politicians, however, 
gives more substantial cause for concern. In recent years there have been 
persistent reports of PNGDF weapons being stolen, borrowed or hired by 
raskols, participants in intergroup fighting, and the sekuriti (bodyguards) of 
bigmen and politicians. There is also evidence that former raskols have been 
recruited into the PNGDF and that some discharged soldiers (often stiff living in 
the barracks) have been involved in raskol activity. In both the Murray Barracks 
and Moem mutinies, also, discharged soldiers were involved. 
Most observers (including myself) still believe that the probability of significant 
military intervention in politics in Papua New Guinea is very low. Not only do 
the small size of the Force, its lack of cohesion, the longstanding antipathy 
between the PNGDF and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, and the 
geography of the country all pose difficulties for potential coup makers,3 but, 
given the localized nature of political power in Papua New Guinea and the 
difficulties which even a legitimate government has in governing, it is difficult 
to envisage what those who carried a coup could do next. Nevertheless, the 
prospects of collaboration between disgruntled soldiers and opportunistic 
politicians to challenge an elected government can no longer be entirely ruled 
out. The Sandline affair, and the challenge to the government's implementation 
of the CEPG report and earlier proposals, have demonstrated to PNGDF 
personnel that a show of force can bring about a shift in government policy, and 
the emergence of factionalism within the Force, and factional links to 
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politicians, has created a climate in which military professionalism has been at 
least partially undermined. 
The appointment of a new commander in October 2001, and the withdrawal of 
troops from Bougainville following the signing of a Bougainville Peace 
Agreement the same year, provide an opportunity for the government and the 
PNGDF to address the problems of capability, morale and discipline in the 
Force, and to adapt the Force to the needs, and budgetary constraints, of the 
2000s. It has become clear, however, that if the decline in the professionalism 
of the PNGDF is to be halted and reversed, there needs to be a substantial 
change in the present culture of the Force. 
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THE BOUGAINV/LLE PEACE AGREEMENT, 
2001-2002: TOWARDS ORDER AND STABILITY 
FOR BOUGAINVILLE? 
Anthony J. Regan 
On 27 March 2002, just days before writs were issued for Papua New Guinea's 
2002 general elections, the National Parliament passed two constitutional laws 
implementing the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which had been signed just 
seven months before (on 30 August 2001). In the lead-up to the votes, about 
1,000 firearms were placed in containment as part of an ongoing weapons 
disposal process. After March, progress in implementation of the Agreement 
continued. 
Yet early in December 2000, only sixteen months before the constitutional laws 
were passed, negotiations towards a political settlement had broken up in 
deadlock. There were fears that the previous eighteen months of often tense 
negotiations for such a settlement may have been wasted. The breakthrough 
came later in December 2000 when Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Alexander Downer, proposed a compromise on the most contentious 
issue in the political negotiations, namely Bougainville' s demand for a 
referendum on independence from Papua New Guinea. That proposal became 
the basis for a January 2001 agreement resolving the referendum issue. Only 
then was it possible to resolve the other major outstanding issues, namely the 
most contentious aspects of the arrangements for a high level of autonomy for 
Bougainville, and a process for disposal of weapons and the associated phased 
withdrawal from Bougainville of the Papua New Guinea security forces. 
The developments since January 2001, part of what is probably one of the 
world's most successful peace processes, offer an important corrective to the 
general perception in Australia of its immediate neighbouring region to the north 
as an 'arc of instability' or a 'crescent of chaos'. Of course, the extensive 
regional and international support for the Bougainville peace process has been 
of critical importance to the success of the process. However, the basic 
dynamics of the process have been internal to Bougainville and to Papua New 
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Guinea more generally. There has been remarkably widespread commitment to 
peace that has gradually contributed to increasing order and stability in 
Bougainville, and in relations between Bougainville and the government of 
Papua New Guinea. Bougainville, a part of Melanesia where violence, chaos and 
instability were once endemic, is being transformed. 
This paper offers a brief overview of the steps in and the dynamics of the peace 
process in the eighteen months from January 2001 to July 2002, and an 
assessment of the prospect that implementation of the Peace Agreement will 
provide the basis for continuing consolidation of peace in Bougainville and 
between Bou gain ville and the rest of Papua New Guinea. 
From conflict and instability to the dynamics of a peace process 
Conflict and its impacts. From 1988 until the late 1990s, the situation in 
Bougainville was a cause for deep disquiet for those concerned about security 
and stability in the Southwest Pacific. There was violent conflict4 with two 
main dimensions. The first was between Bougainvilleans (mainly the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army or BRA) and Papua New Guinea, especially 
its security forces (the Papua New Guinea Defence Force [PNGDF] and the 
Police Mobile Riot Squads). The second was between opposing Bougainvillean 
factions, and often between the BRA and the Bougainville Resistance Forces 
(BRF) who supported the national government forces. 
The conflict had many impacts, not just on Bougainville but also on Papua New 
Guinea more generally, and on regional security. In Bougainville, the conflict 
caused or contributed to terrible suffering. Its impacts included thousands of 
deaths; injuries and traumas for many more people; destruction of infrastructure; 
collapse of the Bougainville economy; and cessation of government services in 
many areas. For Papua New Guinea, several hundred security forces members 
died, morale and capacity of the security forces were undermined (a major 
contributing factor to problems subsequently experienced by those forces, 
especially the PNGDF), and the economy was damaged, both by cessation of 
mining and agricultural commodity production in Bougainville and by a range 
of direct and indirect costs associated with the conflict. For the region, relations 
between Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands were damaged, as were 
relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea. The Bougainville conflict 
was in many ways an influence on the conflict that developed in Solomon 
' There is an extensive literature oa the o.rigins and unfolding of the conflict, including: May and Spriggs 
(1990), Oliver (1991), Spriggs and Denoon (1992), Regan (1998). Ogan (1999), Ohai and .regan (2000), and 
Regan (2000). Sec also the bibliographic essay by Wesley-Smith (1992). 
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Islands from 1998. The 1997 attempt by the Papua New Guinea government to 
use mercenaries to resolve the Bougainville conflict was just one of the many 
aspects of the Bougainville conflict which changed perceptions of security risks 
and needs in the region. 
Dynamics of the peace process. The present peace process,s widely regarded as 
beginning with the talks among Bougainvilleans held in New Zealand in mid-
1997, actually built upon many previous peace efforts going back to 1988. 
While there were many other factors in the origins of the peace process, perhaps 
the most remarkable thing was the emergence of a widespread consensus in 
Bougainville that violent conflict between Bougainvilleans was destructive and 
had to end. This consensus took some years to develop. It was in part driven by 
deep-rooted cultural imperatives, vital to the survival of the small-scale stateless 
societies of Bougainville over many thousands of years, directed to maintaining 
balance within and between societies through reciprocal exchange, and through 
peace-making and reconciliation ceremonies directing to restore balance 
disturbed by conflict. These cultural imperatives were a driving force in many 
local reconciliation efforts. 
Recognition of the need to limit the conflict in Bougainville was articulated not 
just through these localized conflict resolution efforts, but also through the 
broader efforts of local NGOs, church groups and women's organisations. The 
wider movement to end conflict mobilized support in various ways, including 
reference to religious nonns, and emphasis on linkages between local identity 
(lineage, clan, language, district, etc.) and pan-Bougainville identity, focusing 
on the deleterious impacts of intra-Bougainville conflict on Bougainville unity 
and Bougainvillean identity. The gradual mobilization of support for ending 
conflict helped to establish a widely accepted view that violent conflict was 
unacceptable as a means of resolving disputes, at least among Bougainvilleans. 
This was a norm that transcended differences among Bougainvilleans. 
By the first part of 1997 the consensus on the need for peace was driving a 
search by almost all Bougainville factions for renewal of pan-Bougainville 
peace efforts last attempted in December 1995. In Port Moresby there had long 
been elements in both political and bureaucratic leadership supporting a peaceful 
settlement in Bougainville, and while their influence had waned in 1996, there 
was a conjunction of developments in early 1997, largely associated with the 
demise of proposals to engage the Sandline mercenaries to crush rebellion in 
Bougainville, leading to a renewed willingness to explore options for peace 
s For discussion of the origins and development of the Bougainville peace p.rocess. sec Regan (1997); Adams 
(2001); Wehner and Denoon (2001); Regan (200h •• 2001b, 2002a, 2002b): Carl and Garasu (2002). 
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(Regan 1997, 200la). Once the Papua New Guinea and Bougainville sides 
engaged, the process was assisted by the fact that most, if not all, Melanesian 
societies share, to some extent, imperatives concerning restoration of balance 
disturbed by conflict, similar to those in Bougainville. 
International interventions. In the changed circumstances in both Bougainville 
and Port Moresby in the first half of 1997, the way was opened to creative 
international interventions, initially from the government of New Zealand, and 
later from Australia and the United Nations, with support from Solomon Islands, 
Fiji and Vanuatu. Such interventions have continued to be critical to supporting 
the powerful internal dynamics of the peace process in three main ways: 
• by providing a secure environment for building trust and communication 
between previous opponents within which negotiations could take place; 
• by facilitating the peace process, including negotiations, in a variety of ways; 
and 
• by mediating between opponents at some critical points in the process. 
A secure environment was initially provided by negotiations at neutral venues. 
The early meetings were in New Zealand (in July and October 1997 at the 
Burnham military barracks, and in January 1998 at Lincoln University) and 
Australia (in November 1997 in Cairns and in March 1998 in Canberra). These 
early talks both ended the conflict (formally with the Burnham Truce of 
October 1997) and resulted in agreements on the institutional arrangements to 
provide a secure environment on the ground in Bougainville, enabling former 
opponents to establish communication and trust. The arrangements were based 
upon further international interventions. They included an unarmed regional 
monitoring force - from November 1997 to April 1998 the New Zealand-led 
Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) and from May 1998 to the present the 
Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) - and the small United Nations 
Observer Mission on Bougainville established later in 1998 (Smith 2002). 
Establishing the process, 1997-99. Creation of a secure environment happened 
gradually, resulting in a longer than anticipated period - July 1997 to June 1999 
- during which the focus was on building the process and commitment to it 
rather than moving towards outcomes on divisive political issues. Indeed it was 
recognised that political negotiations could not occur without a secure 
environment fust being established. 
Another contributing factor to the slow progress in the early stages was the 
extent of the factional differences in Bougainville. These initially expanded, 
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with new splits emerging among both those supporting independence and those 
in favour of integration of Bougainville into Papua New Guinea. BRA leader 
Francis Ona and his supporters refused to support the process from just after the 
first Burnham talks (July 1997), while among the pro-integrationist factions, 
from late 1998 to November 1999 three Bougainville MPs, leaders of the 
Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF) and the Buka local government (Leitana 
Council of Elders) all refused to work with the mainstream coalition of 
Bougainville groups (Regan 2001a, 2002b). 
Despite these and other difficulties, negotiations for a political settlement to the 
conflict eventually began in June 1999. It then took over two years for those 
negotiations to produce a political settlement. In the process, it was necessary 
to resolve aspects of both dimensions of conflict and division - the intra-
Bougainville dimension and the Bougainville/Papua New Guinea dimension. 
Initial positions in the political negotiations, June 1999-December 2000 
The story of the way in which the previously divided Bougainvillean factions 
(other than Ona and his supporters) developed and maintained a unified 
negotiation position, based on acceptance of a deferred referendum as the way to 
deal with the independence issue with 'highest possible autonomy' to operate 
until the holding of the referendum, has been told elsewhere (Regan 2002b). 
With Bougainville relatively united in its negotiating position, the referendum 
issue became the central - but not the only - issue dividing the Papua New 
Guinea national government and Bougainville. 
The national government was always wi!Jing to entertain special autonomy for 
Bougainville but disputed the validity of the concept of 'highest possible ' 
autonomy, arguing instead for 'highest practicable' autonomy. (While the level 
of autonomy would be higher than elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, it would be 
limited by a range of practical considerations, including political, financial and 
personnel constraints.) But its initial position on the referendum proposal was 
refusal to even discuss the issue until agreed autonomy arrangements had been 
in operation for perhaps fifteen years, at which point - it was argued -
Bougainvilleans would be in a position to evaluate realistically the relative 
advantages of autonomy within Papua New Guinea and secession. 
In relation to weapons disposal, the situation was more complex, with 
differences in positions across the two dimensions of conflict. The national 
government, with support from the BRF and some other pro-integration 
Bougainville groups, pressed for the weapons disposal process to be agreed and 
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begin as quickly as possible, and for it to be as complete as possible. This was 
seen as crucial to the restoration of civil authority on Bougainville. The BRA 
was more ambivalent, in part reflecting a view held by some senior figures that 
the deferral of the referendum would be for a brief period only, and that 
following the referendum Bougainville would be independent, at which point 
the BRA weapons would become those of the army of independent 
Bougainville. The BRA also sought withdrawal of the national government 
security forces as part of any weapons disposal plan; the national government 
was ambivalent towards that demand. 
Reaching agreement on the three main issues, January to August 2001 
Referendum. In the face of possible breakdown of the talks in late March 2000, 
Minister for Bougainville Affairs, Sir Michael Somare, had abandoned the 
refusal to discuss a referendum, and instead accepted an ambiguous UNOMB 
mediated formulation in the Loloata Understanding, under which the autonomy 
and referendum issues would be dealt with together. Having agreed to negotiate 
the issue, Somare found himself in difficulty, especially as the Loloata 
formulation was understood by many in Bougainville as amounting to 
capitulation on the issue. Somare tried a number of ways of escaping the 
problems caused by Loloata, none of them acceptable to Bougainville. At the 
same time, by late 2000 Bougainville was seeking to make the referendum 
proposal more palatable to Port Moresby, for example, by indicating willingness 
to both defer the referendum by ten or more years, and to meet some basic 
conditions (for example in relation to good governance) before the referendum 
could be held. By the end of talks held in Port Moresby in November-December 
2000, however, it was clear that there was deadlock on the referendum issue. 
It was at this point, just days before Christmas 2000, that, in visits to 
Bougainville and Port Moresby, Downer put a possible compromise to 
Bougainville and national government leaders. The compromise involved Papua 
New Guinea accepting that there would be a deferred referendum for 
Bougainville on the independence question, and Bougainville accepting that the 
outcome of that referendum would not be binding, but rather subject to the 
ultimate authority of the parliament. With each side indicating willingness to 
consider the compromise, talks between them were held in Bougainville early in 
January 200 I where an agreement in principle was reached. It was refined at 
longer talks held in East New Britain at the end of that month. 
A referendum would be held, but deferred until no earlier than ten and no later 
than fifteen years after the autonomous government was established. In setting a 
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date, the parties would take account of the progress made both in restoring 'good 
governance' to Bougainville and in relation to weapons disposal. The 
referendum would be among Bougainvilleans and could be conducted by 
national electoral authorities in conjunction with Bougainville, and with 
international observers present. There would be consultation on the outcome of 
the referendum, but implementation of the outcome would be subject to the 
ultimate authority of the National Parliament. 
For the national government, Downer's key selling point was that national 
sovereignty was maintained through recognition of the ultimate authority of the 
National Parliament. To persuade the Bougainvilleans to compromise on the 
binding effect of the referendum, Downer suggested that the acceptance of the 
authority of the parliament was not necessarily the end of the matter. He 
pointed to East Timor as a precedent, suggesting that if a high proportion of 
Bougainvilleans voted in favor of independence, the international community 
would not be able to ignore the outcome. 
Both Bougainville and the national government were seeking constructive ways 
out of the dangers of deadlock, and so were responsive to a possible 
compromise. To accept that compromise, the biggest movement was required 
from the national government, and here a change of minister that had occurred 
just before Downer's visit was of critical importance. Moi Avei replaced Sir 
Michael Somare as minister for Bougainville Affairs, and brought both more 
flexibility and openness to the negotiating table, as well as an ability to build 
support in the bureaucracy and in the cabinet for what many had until then 
regarded as radical positions. A vei' s role continued to be critical to the rapid 
progress made in resolving the outstanding aspects of autonomy and the 
weapons disposal issues over the next few months. 
Weapons disposal. As the East New Britain talks finished in January 2001 , 
A vei applied pressure by indicating that the national government concessions on 
the referendum issue required answering movement from Bougainville in 
relation to weapons disposal. The Bougainville political leaders were eager to 
respond, but had always accepted that weapons disposal was a matter where the 
ex-combatants - BRA and BRF - had to take the lead. 
There had been ongoing discussions on weapons disposal between ex-combatant 
leaders and national government representatives in the Peace Process 
Consultative Conunittee (PPCC), the main committee that dealt with reports of 
ceasefire violations and also acted as a consultative body for the main 'stake-
holders' in the peace process (see Regan 200lb). The BRA, BRF and national 
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government had all submitted proposals for weapons disposal plans through the 
PPCC. While there were many commonalities between those plans, there were 
also significant differences. 
It had become increasingly clear that differences between the BRA and the BRF 
could be a major obstacle to meaningful discussion on weapons disposal 
between the national government and Bougainville. At the same time there was 
a perception that the differences between the BRA and the BRF might not be 
significant. The obvious way ahead was to hold a major meeting involving as 
many commanders as possible from both the BRA and the BRF. It was difficult, 
however, to hold such a meeting in Bougainville. The continuing lack of trust 
between some BRA and BRF elements was an issue here, as were tensions 
among BRA elements resulting from internal BRA conflict in south 
Bougainville that had contributed to problems between the BRA 'high 
command' and some commanders in the south. 
In order to facilitate the greatest possible speed in progress towards an agreed 
weapons plan, the Australian government agreed, at very short notice, to host a 
major meeting of Bougainville ex-combatants in Townsville, Australia, late in 
February 2001. National government ministers and advisers also attended, for if 
the BRA and BRF reached agreement, progress might then be made towards a 
weapons agreement between Bougainville and the national government. 
Discussion soon bogged down in debate on the details of the respective plans of 
the BRA and BRF. It was only on the last day of the talks that it became clear 
that the real obstacle was the continuing lack of trust between the BRA and the 
BRF. Each was concerned that if they were to dispose of all of their weapons, 
the other side would retain access to weapons and might then be able to launch 
an attack on their unarmed opponents. So the talks broke up without an 
agreement being reached. However, they made a valuable contribution by 
simply illuminating the depth of the lack of trust, and in opening communication 
and thereby reducing distrust. 
While in Townsville, Bougainville and the national government technical 
officials also advanced discussions on autonomy, and major negotiations on that 
subject resumed in Port Moresby in early March. As usual, senior BRA and 
BRF commanders were part of the Bougainville delegation, and informal 
discussions on weapons disposal continued. By the end of these autonomy talks, 
early in April, considerable progress had been made in dealing with the 
outstanding aspects of autonomy, a development which contributed to pressure 
to resolve the weapons issue. 
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There was by now general acceptance that weapons disposal was one of the 
three agenda items in the talks. The BRF in particular were insistent that there 
should be a comprehensive disposal process, for otherwise they feared for their 
security. There was growing consensus emerging that the operation of the 
agreed arrangements for referendum and autonomy should in some way be tied 
to the weapons disposal process. Because there was now also agreement on the 
referendum being deferred for ten to fifteen years (rather than the short period 
once envisaged by many in the BRA), there was now more openness among the 
BRA to a general weapons disposal process rather than simply a rapid 
movement to an armed security force for an independent Bougainville. There 
was also a growing realization that delays in reaching agreement on weapons 
could delay finalizing a formal agreement on referendum and autonomy. As a 
result of these developments, Bougainville political leaders now began applying 
pressure to BRA and BRF leaders to reach agreement on weapons. 
Eventually, in late April and early May 2001, a meeting between BRA and BRF 
leaders, facilitated by the member of parliament for Central Bougainville and 
former BRF chairman, Sam Akoitai, resulted in an agreement on the subject. 
That became the basis for negotiations with national government officials, and a 
weapons disposal agreement was at last signed later in May. The agreement 
involved a complex three-stage weapons disposal process, with withdrawal of 
the few remaining security forces members to occur in conjunction with the 
disposal process, and with close links between progress in the disposal plan and 
the passing and coming into operation of the laws proposed to give effect to the 
proposed political agreement. 
In brief, the first stage involves handing in of weapons for storage in containers 
held by BRA and BRF commanders. The second stage involves collection of 
weapons in secure containers at a few central points, the containers to have two 
locks, one held by the UNOMB and the other by the BRA or BRF commander. 
The third stage involves the making of a decision about the ultimate fate of the 
weapons, to occur within four and a half months of the completion of the second 
stage of weapons disposal. 
A two-way link was agreed between the proposed constitutional amendments 
and the weapons disposal plan: 
• the national government was to be pressured to honour its commitment to 
change the necessary laws (the national constitution and the organic laws) 
because secure containment (second stage) of weapons disposal occurs only 
when the constitutional laws implementing the Agreement are passed; 
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• Bougainville was to be pressured to ensure secure containment occurs not 
only because the constitutional changes on both referendum and autonomy 
will not come into operation until the UNOMB certifies that secure 
containment of the weapons (second stage) has occurred, but also because 
provision for possible UNOMB verification concerning substantial 
compliance during the third stage could result in delay of election of the 
proposed autonomous Bougainville government. 
Autonomy. Reflecting the fact that it was the least controversial of the three 
main issues being dealt with in the talks, during 2000 there had been progress 
towards agreement on some aspects of autonomy. For example, agreement had 
been reached that there should be an autonomous government for Bougainville, 
with structures largely chosen by Bougainville under its own constitution. But 
although there was also general agreement that Bougainville should have 
extensive powers and functions, there were still significant differences about 
what they should be, and there had been little progress in resolving complex 
issues concerning the financial and personnel arrangements and 
intergovernmental relations (arrangements needed to manage the special 
dynamics to be expected in relations between the national government and a 
Bougainville government with a high degree of autonomy). 
In the four weeks of talks in Port Moresby in March-April 200r considerable 
progress was made on many aspects of powers and functions, financial and 
personnel arrangements, and on the absence of most forms of national 
government control powers in the intergovernmental relations arrangements. 
However there was limited progress on several difficult issues, including a 
separate police force and public service for Bougainville, and powers over 
human rights, judiciary and defence. 
Final details of autonomy arrangements were resolved in five weeks of meetings 
in Port Moresby in May-June 2001 where both sides made significant 
compromises on the remaining - and generally controversial - aspects of 
autonomy. On some matters where compromise proved difficult, key issues 
were left to resolution by later processes - for example, aspects of 
Bougainville's proposals for its powers over human rights were left to a later 
inquiry. 
A draft agreement was finalised in June 2001 and then referred to both the 
Bougainville political leaders (Bougainville People's Congress and Interim 
Provincial Government) and the National Executive Council. Changes sought 
by the latter body resulted in further brief negotiating sessions in July and 
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August, and some changes to the draft agreement before it was finalised for 
signing on 30 August. 
In brief, the autonomy arrangements6 allow Bougainville considerable freedom 
to establish its own government under a Bougainville constitution. While 
thirteen listed powers are to be retained by the national government, all other 
powers and functions known to government are available to be transferred to 
Bougainville, subject to there being necessary capacity. In particular, 
Bougainville will be free to establish its own public service, police and 
judiciary, provided some basic conditions to maintain parity of systems with 
those of the national government are met. The national government will have no 
power to control Bougainville through suspension of the autonomous 
government or withdrawal of its powers and functions. However, it will have 
limited powers to withhold payment of grants due to Bougainville in cases of 
persistent abuse of basic standards of financial management. 
Developing and passing constitutional laws, September 2001 to March 2002 
Even after the Peace Agreement was signed, negotiations between Bougainville 
and ~apua ~ew Guinea have continued as part of the implementation process, 
~oth 1~ relat10_n to development of the constitutional laws intended to implement 
It and in relanon to other matters. The further negotiations have been required 
for two main reasons. First, the parties agreed to leave details of some matters 
to be resolved later, during drafting or implementation of the laws. Secondly, 
the autonomy arrangements, in particular, have been conceived as a broad 
enabling framework, within which many aspects of the specifics of government 
arrangements are intended to develop as circumstances and needs change. To 
date, however, the negotiations have been far less adversarial than those 
involved in development of the Agreement itself, there having been a clear 
commitment on both sides to honour both its spirit and detail. 
The constitutional laws had to be drafted with considerable haste, mainly 
because general elections for the National Parliament were scheduled for mid-
2002, and it was agreed that the complex steps involved in amending the 
constitutional laws should be completed before parliament was dissolved for the 
elections. A small joint national govemment/Bougainville technical committee 
was established to resolve matters of detail while working with the 
constitutional drafters and helping them interpret the Agreement. That 
committee and the drafters worked over several weeks from mid September to 
early November, when the constitutional laws were published in the National 
' For more detailed discussion of the autonomy arrangements, see Regan (2002a: 120.2). 
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Gazette. There were two laws - a long and complex set of amendments to the 
Papua New Guinea constitution, and a new Organic Law on Peace-building in 
Bougainville. 
Passing each of the two laws involved complex procedural requirements, in 
particular two separate absolute majority votes of the parliament separated by at 
least two months. The first votes took place on 23 January, when, after making 
a small change to the draft amendments to the constitution, 85 MPs voted in 
favour of the constitutional amendment and 86 in favour of the organic law. 
The second vote was on 27 March, when 85 voted in favour of the constitutional 
amendment and 87 for the organic law. On neither occasion was there a dissent 
or abstention;7 the support was spread across all parties and groupings in the 
parliament. 
Other steps to implement the Agreement 
In the lead-up to both votes on the draft constitutional laws, considerable efforts 
were made to implement the first stage of the weapons disposal process. The 
Minister for Bougainville Affairs, Moi Avei, constantly emphasized the need for 
the Bougainville ex-combatants to convince the MPs that they were serious 
about restoring civil authority. That pressure from Avei was reinforced by the 
awareness among the ex-combatants that weapons disposal needed to proceed in 
any event if the constitutional laws were to come into operation. The ex-
combatants responded well, and by the time of the second vote almost 1,000 
weapons had been placed in containers, though something less than 200 of those 
were modem automatic weapons. 
After the second vote, implementation of the weapons disposal process slowed 
considerably, although it has continued, with some 400 more weapons put into 
stage one containment by end of July 2002. There were several reasons for the 
slowdown, one of which had to do with the difficulties of keeping focus on 
weapons disposal during campaigning for the general election, the writs for 
which were issued in April, with voting in June. 
Another factor concerned the arrangements for immunity from prosecution and 
pardon for those who could be, or had already been, charged with criminal 
offences committed in connection with the conflict. Immunity and pardon had 
been promised as long ago as the Lincoln Agreement of January 1998, a promise 
repeated in the Peace Agreement. In response to Lincoln some Bougainvillean 
1 There are 109 seats in the Papua New GuinCll parliament. Six were vacant at the time due to actions being 
taken against MPs under the Leadership Code of Conduct. Other MPs were absent on each occasion. 
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prisoners had been released from gaol, and prosecutions in relation to things 
done in the course of the conflict had ceased. However, as nothing further had 
been done to formalize the promises of immunity and pardon, some ex-
combatants were now concerned that they might risk prosecution if they were to 
put their weapons into containment before details of immunity and pardon were 
made clear. 
Under some pressure from Bougainville, negotiations between their officials and 
those of the national government began, at last, in early May 2002. After a 
series of negotiations and consultations, agreement was reached and late in July 
cabinet approved the text of a notice to be published in the National Gazette. In 
essence, it will provide immunity to all persons (Bougainvilleans and members 
of the security forces) who committed most kinds of offences (sexual offences 
are excluded) in some way connected with the Bougainville conflict between 1 
October 1988 and 30 August 2001. Offences committed purely for personal 
motives will not be covered. 
The completion of arrangements for immunity and pardon should result in 
pressure again being applied to the ex-combatants to complete stage two of the 
weapons disposal process - secure containment in double locked containers. 
Completion of stage two is now planned for about October 2002. If at that point 
the UNOMB verifies completion, the constitutional laws can be brought in. 
In the meantime some steps towards establishing the autonomous government 
and transferring powers can be taken. First, the constitutional laws 
implementing the Peace Agreement recognize that initial steps towards the 
Bougainville constitution can be taken even before the laws come into operation. 
In particular, a Bougainville constitutional commission can be established to 
develop the draft constitution, and if so both that body and the draft constitution 
it produces can be recognized retrospectively when the laws come into 
operation. Taking advantage of this possibility, Bougainville leaders met in 
June and in July to make decisions on the composition and tenllS of reference 
for the proposed Bougainville Constitutional Commission, which is expected to 
begin work in August or September 2002. 
At the same time, the Agreement provides for first steps in relation to transfers 
of powers and functions to be taken even before the autonomous government is 
established, through the delegation to the existing Bougainville provincial 
government authorities of powers under national laws in relation to the public 
servants and police officers working in Bougainville. Again, the Bougainville 
administration has made requests for such delegations of powers. 
21 
'Arc of lnstab///ty'? Melanesia In the early 2iWs 
What other steps are taken in implementation of the Agreement during the 
second half of 2002 and in 2003, and the timetable for taking such steps, will 
depend largely upon the eventual date for completion of stage two of weapons 
disposal and the coming into operation of the constitutional laws implementing 
the Agreement. If those two things occur as planned in October 2002, then it 
would be possible to complete the proposed Bougainville constitution (through 
the work of a constituent assembly and formal approval by the national 
government of the final draft constitution) by some point in the first half of 
2003, and to hold the election for the first autonomous government within a few 
months of that - perhaps as early as mid 2003. 
A final aspect of implementation of the Agreement concerns the continued 
efforts being made among Bougainvilleans divided by the conflict to reconcile 
and unite. Semi-traditional reconciliation exercises are continuing in many parts 
of Bougainville, but major reconciliation efforts are probably going to be 
necessary in some areas over the few months from mid 2002 if stage two of 
weapons disposal is to be completed as planned. One aspect of reconciliation 
concerns Francis Ona and his supporters, who have remained outside the peace 
process since 1997. In mid 2002 there are hopeful signs that the differences 
between Ona and his former BRA and Bougainville Interim Government 
supporters involved in the peace process may soon be resolved. More generally, 
with criminal liability for acts committed as part of the conflict no longer an 
issue as a result of the amnesty arrangements, there is slowly increasing interest 
in establishing some form of truth and reconciliation commission to encourage 
broader progress to reconciliation, especially (but not only) in relation to the acts 
of violence committed by the Papua New Guinea security forces (Kabui 2002: 
65). 
The future of the peace process 
There are, of course, uncertainties about the sustainability of the peace process 
generally, and more specifically concerning implementation of the Peace 
Agreement. Some of these have been discussed elsewhere (see Regan 2002a). 
Concerning the peace process, in post-conflict Bougainville there are many 
people well used to resorting to violence to resolve conflict, and there continue 
to be many deep divisions. While the dynamics that have been so central to the 
peace process remain powerful, widespread acceptance of norms that dictate 
against the use of violence will not necessarily be enough to prevent a return to 
violence. The hope among Bougainvillean leaders, however, is that the longer 
the peace process runs and the more widespread the commitment to 
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reconciliation, the greater the popular commitment to and sustainability of 
peace. 
Further, the Bougainville negotiators envisaged the Peace Agreement providing 
a broad framework that would enable Bougainvilleans to deal with sources of 
division and conflict in new and creative ways, minimizing the risk of future 
violence. Not only do Bougainville leaders have a strong interest in ensuring 
that the Agreement is implemented, but there are also high expectations of the 
Agreement in Bougainville. 
Clearly, then, if expectations are not met, because implementation of the 
arrangements is either blocked in Port Moresby or is not actively pursued there, 
it remains possible that conflict could again develop between Bougainville and 
the national government as well as within Bougainville. (Of course, it is also 
true that even if the Agreement is implemented in full conflict may still develop 
- for example, because there continues to be inequitable development in 
Bougainville that fuels division and conflict similar to that which developed in 
1988, or simply because not enough is done to bring about reconciliation of 
present divisions in Bougainville. However, the initial hurdle is implementation 
of the Agreement, and so that is the focus of discussion here.) 
Initially, it remains to be seen whether the commitment to implementing the 
Agreement so far being shown by the national government will continue. The 
bi-partisan support shown in the National Parliament for the constitutional 
amendments suggests that there is little risk of significant policy changes in 
relation to Bougainville after the 2002 elections. However, there are interest 
groups at the national level who have little sympathy for allocation of resources 
to Bougainville, or who oppose rapid implementation of autonomy there for fear 
that it will create destabilizing demands for similar arrangements in other parts 
of the country. Papua New Guinea may be facing severe fiscal crisis over the 
next several years, and the risk remains that Bougainville could become a matter 
of very low priority, opening the way for more influence on the part of those 
opposing autonomy for Bougainville. 
It is also true that even if there is full commitment to implementing the laws, 
there may well be significant obstacles to be overcome. For a start, even the 
coming into operation of the laws is not certain, that being dependant on 
completion of stage two of the weapons disposal plan. If rapprochement with 
Ona does not proceed as expected and his armed supporters remain outside the 
weapons disposal process, there could be difficulties for both BRA and BRF 
23 
'Arc of Instability' ? Melanesia In the early 2CXXJs 
elements in central and south Bougainville in completing stage two disposal to a 
degree that will enable the UNOMB to verify its completion. 
Once the constitutional laws do come into operation, there are a number of 
potential concerns about implementation, especially in relation to autonomy. 
They include: 
• the complexity of the arrangements and the necessity for ongoing 
negotiations about their implementation, coupled with the limited 
administrative capacity in both Port Moresby and Bougainville needed to 
make the arrangements operate as intended; 
• the fiscal crisis which the national government is facing and the likelihood of 
competing pressures for special funding arrangements for other priorities (for 
example in relation to the conflict in the Southern Highlands) which can be 
expected to restrict national govenunent ability to provide the funding 
needed for the autonomy arrangements to operate effectively; 
• the weakness of the Bougainville economy, which severely limits the internal 
revenue base for the autonomous government; 
• the limited administrative capacity in Bougainville to utilize the autonomy 
arrangements fully. 
There are certainly dangers that autonomy may not work as well as anticipated. 
If it fails to meet the high expectations that have been generated there could be 
considerable frustration among Bougainvilleans, something that would increase 
the risk of renewed violence. In the early stages, the most severe pressures will 
probably come from the limited funding likely to be available. As a 
consequence, there may well be some pressure on donors, especially Australia 
and New Zealand, to assist. 
Conclusion 
The progress made in the Bougainville peace process in the nineteen months 
from January 2001 to July 2002, has been remarkable by any measure .. The 
political negotiations moved from deadlock to signing of the Bougainville Peace 
Agreement in eight months, development and passing by parliament of complex 
constitutional legislation to implement the agreement was achieved in the 
following seven months, and implementation of a number of other key aspects 
of the Agreement has continued. 
In the process, the two main dimensions of conflict and difference involved in 
the Bougainville conflict have been dramatically reduced. In terms of intra-
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Bougainville divisions, while most groups had previously united behind the 
common Bougainville negotiating position in relation to referendum and 
autonomy, in January 2001 they were still deeply divided in relation to weapons 
disposal. Those differences were resolved by May 2001. In terms of divisions 
between Bougainville and Papua New Guinea, in January 2001 there were major 
divisions over all three main issues - referendum, autonomy and weapons 
disposal. All issues were resolved within eight months. More importantly, in 
the following months all sides of both sets of divisions have cooperated well in 
implementation of the Agreement, in the process further reducing division and 
promoting reconciliation across both dimensions of division. This progress has 
been all the more dramatic because so much of it has had to be achieved through 
still further negotiations. 
The progress from January 2001 was built firmly on what had been achieved in 
earlier stages of the peace process, and in particular on a key dynamic of the 
process, the consensus among Bougainvilleans on the need to end violent 
conflict. Bougainvillean leaders then built their relationships with national 
government leadership elements committed to peace. Supported by substantial 
international interventions that provided key inputs (a secure environment, 
facilitation, and some mediation) they together built a workable peace process. 
Among the keys to the success of the process has been the pace and the 
inclusiveness of the process. While there has sometimes been frustration -
especially in some national capitals in the region - at the slow pace of the 
process, in retrospect it has been important that the first two years ( 1997 to 
1999) were focused on process rather than outcomes, for that provided the time 
needed to build communication and trust, and through that, commitment to the 
process. Without that time spent consolidating the process, it would have been 
extremely difficult to slowly deal with the deep divisions in positions on 
outcomes (political issues) in the following twenty-six months. 
Finally, the peace process developing in Bougainville since 1997 offers 
challenges to widely held perceptions in Australia {and elsewhere in the 
neighbouring region) that the Southwest Pacific is becoming an 'arc of 
instability' where there is ever increasing and more generalised instability and 
chaos. 
Of course, from 1988 the Bougainville conflict was an important contributor to 
such perceptions. More recent experience in Bougainville suggests, however, 
that dynamics have been generated in response to the chaos and instability of 
violent conflict which have contributed to the emergence of widely accepted 
norms that limit resort to violence to resolve problems. Such norms contribute 
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to a broadly held consensus on the need for peace, order and stability, something 
perhaps akin to the slow development of similar norms in other parts of the 
world that are often seen as being part of the development of the rule of law or 
of the emergence of civil society. Bougainville experience suggests that it may 
be necessary to lake a long view of instability and chaos and their consequences, 
and perhaps to rethink some policies. 
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GUNS, MONEY AND POLITICS: 
DISORDER IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS 
Sinclair Dinnen 
For many observers, the elections scheduled for late 2001 offered a possible 
circuit breaker to Solomon Islands' deepening political crisis. Behind the crisis 
lay four years of ethnic tensions, a de facto coup in June 2000, and a progressive 
collapse of the economy and, in many places, law and order. The incumbent 
Sogavare administration had come to power as a result of the coup instigated by 
an ethnically-based militia group, the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), and 
elements of the paramilitary police field force. As a result, it had little 
legitimacy in the eyes of many Solomon islanders and, moreover, appeared quite 
incapable of providing the leadership necessary to restore peace and stability. 
During its period in office, the economy had gone into free fall, with all major 
commercial enterprises suspended, and there was growing evidence of 
systematic conuption and plunder among political leaders, senior officials, and 
their militant associates. Since the coup, Honiara, the national capital on 
Guadalcanal, had been under the effective control of bands of anned militants. 
The police force remained deeply divided and was no longer able or willing to 
enforce the law. 
Sadly, the new government formed after the December 2001 elections and led 
by Sir Allan Kemakeza has not lived up to expectations. It is made up of 
remnants of the Sogavare administration and includes several high-profile 
former members of the MEF. While there have been some signs of 
improvement, including in the critical area of disarmament, the national 
economy continues to verge on bankruptcy, essential services have ceased in 
many places, public servants go unpaid, and corruption and lack of security 
remain serious concerns. The Kernakeza government appears incapable of 
leading the Solomon Islands out of its current predicament and, in the view of 
many observers, there is a clear need for far greater engagement by the main 
regional players, notably Australia and New Zealand. 
'Arc of lnstobl/lty'? Me/ones/a In the early 2000s 
Background to the conflict 
The deeper roots of the current crisis lie in the legacies of colonial rule, the 
performance of successive post-independence governments, and the impacts of 
more recent processes of globalization. As with Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu, the challenges of nation-building in such a diverse and fragmented 
environment are formidable. There is still little sense of unity binding the 
disparate communities scattered throughout the archipelago. Over eighty 
languages are spoken among a population of less than half a million people. 
The weak post-colonial state has little presence in the daily lives of most 
Solomon [slanders, the vast majority of whom are subsistence farmers in rural 
villages. Primary identities and allegiances remain implanted in language and 
kin-based associations rather than in abstracted notions of 'nation' and 
'citizenship'. 
The centralization of political power has been resisted actively at local levels 
since the beginning of colonial administration. In the period immediately 
preceding independence in 1978, several districts sought to loosen or sever ties 
with the political centre, including the well-known 'breakaway' movement in 
what is now Western Province (Bennett 1987: 327-330). The provincial 
government system established in 1981 did little to allay suspicions of central 
government in Honiara (Larmour 1985). Wealthier provinces continue to resent 
the meagre benefits received from central government in return for the 
substantial contribution they make to national revenues through logging and 
fishing. 
When the national capital was relocated to Honiara after the Second World War, 
migrants were drawn to Guadalcanal from other parts of the country. Large 
numbers came from the densely populated and resource-poor island of Malaita. 
They were attracted by the prospect of employment in the plantations, in the 
government departments and businesses in Honiara, or, since 1997, in the Gold 
Ridge mine to the east of the capital. Resentment towards 'settlers' grew among 
Guadalcanal communities, often inflamed by opportunist local leaders. It has 
been most marked among those living in the least developed and least accessible 
parts of Guadalcanal, notably the Weather Coast in the south of the island. 
Malaitan settlers, in particular, are accused of being aggressive and insensitive 
to local kastom and are viewed by many to have prospered unfairly at the 
expense of indigenes. 
These tensions are bound up with deeper anxieties about land, development, and 
identity, that are shared by most Solomon islanders. They have been aggravated 
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on Guadalcanal by the fact that customary land has been sold to outsiders. This 
has created enormous resentment among a younger generation of Guadalcanal 
people who have thereby been dispossessed of their inheritance. Rather than 
blaming those who sold the land, anger has been directed against the Malaitans 
who have bought, rented or squatted on land in north Guadalcanal. In December 
1998, these grievances crystallized into indigenous demands for rent for the use 
of Honiara as the national capital, compensation for local people killed by 
settlers, plus restrictions on citizens from other provinces owning land on 
Guadalcanal (Petition by the Indigenous People of Guadalcanal, 1998). 
Incompetent and corrupt governments have contributed to the legitimacy crisis 
of the post-colonial state. This manifests itself in growing levels of popular 
disenchantment with the formal political process and, in many provincial 
islands, in a spread of autonomy sentiments. Unemployment and limited 
economic opportunities are a major impediment to the aspirations of a young 
and rapidly growing population. The narrow economic base inherited from 
colonial times has meant a high level of dependence on the vagaries of 
international commodity markets. Low commodity prices, rising oil prices and 
the Asian financial crisis have all had adverse impacts in recent years and 
Solomon Islands is increasingly dependent on international development 
assistance and commercial loans. 
The coup 
Groups of young Guadalcanal men began stockpiling homemade and 
rehabilitated Second World War weapons as early as 1996 (Kabutaulaka 2001). 
Organized disturbances started in late 1998 and spread rapidly throughout rural 
parts of the island. Militant groups - known initially as the Guadalcanal 
Revolutionary Army (GRA) and later renamed the lsatabu Freedom Movement 
(IFM) - embarked on a violent campaign of harassment and intimidation, 
directed mainly against Malaitan settlers. Up to 20,000 people were displaced 
from their homes in rural Guadalcanal and forced to seek refuge in Honiara or 
return to their islands of origin. Violent confrontations occurred between the 
GRA/IFM and the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP). In June 1999, the 
government declared a state of emergency in Guadalcanal. 
In response to a request from the SI government, the Commonwealth sent 
former Fijian Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, as a special envoy to help 
conclude a peaceful resolution to the crisis on Guadalcanal. A series of peace 
agreements brokered by Rabuka committed the government to address the 
concerns of the rural Guadalcanal population and restrain police operations, and 
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called on the militant groups to disband, surrender their weapons, and return to 
their home villages. However, they failed to stem the spreading militancy. 
With the IFM in effective control of rural Guadalcanal, Honiara became a 
Malaitan enclave. Another armed group - the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) -
emerged at the beginning of 2000. This group, with close Links to the 
paramilitary police field force, claimed to represent the interests of displaced 
Malaitans and demanded substantial compensation for the lives of Malaitans 
killed by the IFM and for damage and destruction to their properties. The MEF 
had access to high-powered police weapons, uniforms and equipment, and began 
attacking and intimidating suspected IFM members and sympathizers in the 
Honiara area. With the security situation on Guadalcanal, particularly around 
Honiara, deteriorating rapidly, the SIAC (Solomon Islands Alliance for Change) 
government made a desperate plea for anned assistance from Australia and New 
Zealand. However, neither government was prepared to intervene and called 
upon the parties to devise appropriate local solutions. 
On 5 June 2000, MEF militants, together with members of the paramilitary 
police field force, seized control of key installations in Honiara, including the 
well-stocked national armoury. Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu was 
forced to resign and was replaced by the opposition leader, Manasseh Sogavare. 
Following this de facto coup, acts of intimidation and reprisals against civilians 
by militants increased. Honiara was under the control of an illegal 'joint 
operation' between the MEF and elements of the police. The new government 
was neither capable of challenging, nor inclined to challenge, the heavily armed 
militant group that had brought it to power. Attacks were launched by the joint 
operation against suspected IFM positions on the outskirts of the capital and an 
Australian-donated patrol boat was used to shell positions on the eastern 
shoreline. Homes and property belonging to those deemed opposed to the 
armed takeover were looted or destroyed. Vehicles were stolen and business 
houses intimidated. Honiara was effectively cut off from the rest of the country. 
These events had a disastrous impact on the national economy. Operations were 
suspended at the Gold Ridge mine after the coup, as they had been earlier at 
Solomon Islands Plantations. Government revenue dropped dramatically. As 
the impact of events in Honiara sank in, shock turned to anger in many other 
parts of the country. There were reports of intimidation against Malaitans in the 
Western Province (STBC 18 June 2000). These led to reprisals against non-
Malaitans in Honiara, setting off a vicious cycle of retaliatory actions. There 
was also concern about possible spillover effects from Bougainville, which was 
emerging from a protracted civil war (see Regan, this volume). Members of the 
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Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) were reported to be providing security 
in Choiseul and Western provinces against incursions by the MEF (The National 
[Papua New Guinea) 12 June 2000). Autonomy sentiments were re-ignited in 
several provinces. 
The Sogavare government commenced its peacemaking efforts by paying SI$10 
million to provincial and militant representatives from Malaita and Guadalcanal 
for a range of outstanding grievances on both sides. Dispensing large amounts 
of compensation was to become the central pillar of the government's 
peacemaking strategy. Compensation has a long history in parts of the Solomon 
Islands as a means of settling disputes between groups. Over the years it has 
been extended beyond the kastom context to a variety of non-traditional 
situations, including claims against the state (Akin 1999). In practice, it has 
become increasingly commercialized, with monetary payments replacing 
traditional items of wealth. This has opened up new opportunities for self-
enrichment and abuse. While by no means the first government to employ this 
practice, the use of compensation by the Sogavare administration has 
contributed significantly to the disorder over the past two years. 
The Townsville Peace Agreement 
Having declined earlier requests for assistance by the Ulufa'alu government, 
reinvigorated efforts were made by Australia and New Zealand to bring the 
militant groups to the negotiating table. The immediate priority was to end the 
fighting between the militant groups. Talks brokered by the Australians resulted 
in the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement in August 2000. The next step was to 
conclude a substantive peace settlement between the combatants. 
Approximately 130 delegates were flown to an Australian military base in 
Townsville for this purpose. They included militant leaders, representatives 
from the various provincial authorities, and the national government. The 
Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) was signed on 15 October 2000. 
Under the provisions of the TPA, members of the police who had abandoned 
their posts to engage in militant activities were eligible to return to the force 
without fear of sanctions. An act of parliament was to provide a general 
amnesty to members of militant groups for criminal acts committed during the 
course of the 'ethnic crisis', as well as for any civil liability arising from such 
acts. In return, militants were to surrender all weapons and ammunition within 
thirty days of the signing of the agreement under the supervision of an 
International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT). A Peace Monitoring Council 
was to be established 'to monitor, report on and enforce the terms of the 
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agreement'. Former combatants were to be repatriated to their home villages in 
Guadalcanal and Malaita and provided with counselling and rehabilitation 
services. The government was to seek international assistance to help 
recompense those who had suffered material loss as a result of the conflict. 
The TP A succeeded in ending the fighting and its signing was greeted by 
spontaneous celebrations on the streets of Honiara. In retrospect, however, it 
did not provide a sustainable framework for the peace process and its 
shortcomings have become increasingly apparent with the passage of time. Its 
provisions reflected the views of the militant groups, in particular those of the 
more powerful and articulate MEF leadership. The voices of the wider Solomon 
Islands civil society, who had been the most active proponents of peace and 
moderation, were excluded. The provisions of the TP A assumed that the two 
militant groups were cohesive and structured bodies capable of fulfilling their 
obligations under the agreement. In reality, divisions had always existed in both 
entities based around loyalties to particular leaders, places of origin, language, 
kinship ties and so on. Harold Keke, a maverick Guadalcanal militant from the 
Weather Coast, refused to be a party to the agreement. Factionalism increased 
in both groups after the signing of the TPA. In the case of the former IFM, this 
degenerated, in some places, into armed feuds between rival leaders - who were 
often related to each other. The process of fragmentation hinted at the critical 
role of a more complex and dynamic local politics being played out beneath the 
rubric of ethnic tensions and discrete militant groups. 
Under the TPA, the disarmament process was to be driven by the former militant 
groups themselves, rather than by an independent enforcement body. Weapons 
in the possession of the militants were to be handed over to their conunanders 
and then placed under the control of unarmed members of the IPMT at selected 
sites in Guadalcanal and Malaita. The role of the IPMT, comprising 35 
Australians and 14 New Zealanders, was to monitor and observe the 
dis.armament process, rather than enforce it. The fragmentation of the militant 
groups complicated matters by dissolving the chains of command that were 
necessary to progress disarmament under the agreement. 
While civil society groups had called for any amnesty provisions to be linked to 
a truth and reconciliation process, the TPA allowed those who had engaged in 
serious human rights abuses to escape any form of personal accountability. This 
failure to address issues of justice added greatly to the challenges of restoring 
the rule of law. It was hard to promote the authority of law when known 
criminals had been granted total immunity for the consequences of their actions. 
Likewise with the provisions allowing former militants to rejoin the police. 
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Many retained their illegally acquired weapons and maintained links with 
militants. Their presence, particularly among senior ranks, intimidated other 
officers and contributed to the continuing paralysis of the force. In the eyes of 
ordinary Solomon islanders, the police had become a tainted, partisan and 
corrupt institution. 
The use of monetary compensation as the principal instrument for redressing 
grievances raised unrealistic expectations on the part of thousands of people 
affected by the conflict, generated further divisions between claimants, and 
provided ample opportunities for abuse. One of the most fundamental 
weaknesses of the TPA was that it sought to provide a single comprehensive 
settlement. By contrast, the Bougainville peace process has involved a rolling 
series of negotiations and agreements. The TPA constituted a static agreement 
that was incapable of adjusting to the rapidly changing circumstances on the 
ground. It was also premised on quite unrealistic assumptions about the 
capacity of the profoundly weak Solomon Islands state to implement its 
provisions. 
The instrumentalization of disorder 
A priority after the signing of the TP A was to disarm and demobilize former 
militants. Approximately 500 high-powered weapons, with ammunition, had 
been seized from police armouries by the MEF in the lead-up to the coup. 
While they possessed some automatic weapons, the IFM arsenal consisted 
largely of homemade and rehabilitated Second World War weapons. When the 
thirty-day deadline for surrendering weapons expired in mid November 2000, 
approximately 800, mainly homemade, guns had been handed in. The deadline 
was extended several times over the following year and a half. Disarmament 
was impeded by lack of an effective enforcement process. Former militants and 
others also appreciated the strategic value of the gun in an environment where 
law enforcement had effectively collapsed. 
On the matter of demobilization, the government agreed to pay repatriation 
allowances in order to induce former militants to return to their villages of 
origin. Further payments were provided for accommodation and the hiring of 
vehicles and canoes. For some, repatriation schemes became an opportunity for 
making money. For example, many former militants who had been repatriated 
to Malaita simply turned around and returned to Honiara to collect further 
payments. By the end of April 2001, the government had reportedly paid out 
SI$40 million to ex-militants (Pacnews 1 March 2001). The manner in which 
these funds were distributed by ex-militant leaders generated further conflict, as 
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did rumours that some individuals and groups and were being paid more than 
others (SIBC 23 November 2000). 
Another scheme to absorb ex-militants was their appointment as special 
constables, ostensibly to help in the restoration of law and order. Each special 
constable was put on the government payroll. Like the repatriation allowances, 
this scheme was highly susceptible to abuse. By the end of 2001, the number of, 
mainly Maliatan, special constables had grown to nearly 2000 and the scheme 
had become a major drain on scarce government resources. Ill-disciplined 
special constables with access to illegal weapons became a source of 
lawlessness in many areas. On several occasions Sogavare proposed that former 
militants become the nucleus of a new Solomon Islands Defence Force. This 
proposal met with vigorous opposition from many quarters and, fortunately, 
proceeded no further. 
In the post-Townsville period, escalating lawlessness and the deteriorating 
economic situation became the outstanding concerns, surpassing the original 
ethnic tensions on which the TPA peace process was based. Honiara was the 
hub of growing disorder involving the activities of former militants, criminals, 
corrupt leaders and assorted opportunists. The line between ex-militants and 
criminals became blurred in practice. In view of the weakness of government 
and police, those with guns could act with impunity. Ministers, public servants 
and business people complained of regular harassment by ex-militants in respect 
of compensation demands (SIBC 7 October 2001). As the financial situation 
deteriorated, ex-militants began threatening bank staff who refused to accept 
government cheques (SIBC 1 February 2001). The practice of demanding 
compensation on the slightest pretext was widespread and often amounted to 
little more than criminal extortion. 
While these problems were concentrated in Honiara, the dispersal of former 
militants and guns was followed by an increase in criminality and banditry in 
many rural areas, particularly in Guadalcanal and Malaita. 
The Peace Monitoring Council attempted to initiate a review of the TP A in 
September 2001 (Radio Australia 14 September 2001). This had to include the 
parties to the initial agreement. A notable irony was that the review process 
entailed reconstituting the original militant entities that had, in large part, 
dispersed and disbanded in the period since the TP A was signed. In the event, 
the review was suspended after the former IFM delegation withdrew following 
the brutal murder of a one of their ex-commanders (Pacnews 24 September 
2001). 
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Funding the increasingly corrupted compensation process was a major 
challenge. More than 50 per cent of compensation claims were fraudulent, 
according to the acting auditor general (S/BC 12 July 2001). With little prospect 
of assistance from donors, the government negotiated a large commercial loan 
from a private Taiwanese bank (Sydney Morning Herald 10 April 2001). 
Shortly after the arrival of the first tranche, the deputy prime minister, Sir Allan 
Kemakeza, and his permanent secretary were accused of allocating themselves 
payments of SI$800,000 and SI$700,000 respectively for properties allegedly 
destroyed during the conflict (SIBC 26 July 2001). Both were dismissed for 
misleading cabinet and having 'serious, personal vested interests' in the 
compensation scheme. At the same time, the administration was granting 
generous duty remissions and tax exemptions to selected individuals and 
businesses. This was a way of rewarding supporters, repaying political debts, 
and compromising potential critics. It was also a response to intimidation and 
threats, and a way of buying off the more troublesome ex-militant leaders. 
Despite the acute financial crisis, millions of dollars of national revenue were 
foregone in remissions on cigarettes and beer imports (SIBC 18 July 2001). 
While these developments were taking place, other parts of the country were 
suffering the consequences of the prolonged crisis at the political centre. Health 
and other provincial grants had fallen into serious arrears. Public sector unions, 
representing around 8000 members, threatened a nationwide strike unless they 
received their pay and unless all duty remissions were cancelled (Radio 
Australia 7 September 2001 ). Provincial premiers issued a joint conununique in 
August 2001 claiming that the central government owed the provinces and 
Honiara City Council more than SI$16,800,000 in grants and arrears. The 
already fragile character of national unity was threatened further by growing 
pressures for autonomy in several island provinces. 
The Kemakeza government - continuing decline 
The overwhelming desire for change on the part of ordinary voters was reflected 
in the December 2001 election results. Only 18 sitting members of the 50-seat 
national parliament were returned. Unfortunately the post-election process of 
government formation was less susceptible to the weight of public opinion. The 
civil society network alleged that large sums of money were offered to the 32 
new members to back particular candidates for the position of prime minister 
(PINA Nius Online 16 December 2001). Sir Allan Kemakeza's People's 
Alliance Party (PAP) emerged as the largest coalition, with 20 seats. Ousted 
Prime Minister Ulufa'alu' s Solomon Islands Alliance for Change (SIAC) won 
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12 seats. However, amid rumours that there would be another coup if Ulufa'alu 
returned to power, SIAC changed their nomination for prime minister to Pattison 
Oti. Ulufa'alu promptly withdrew from SIAC, taking 6 Liberal Party members 
with him, thereby scuttling SIAC's chances of resuming office. Sir Allan 
Kemakeza was declared prime minister on 17 December 2001. 
Many Solomon Islanders greeted the announcement of the composition of the 
'new' government with dismay. Kemakeza had been discredited and eventually 
sacked for his handling of the compensation scheme as a minister in the 
Sogavare administration, and was known to have close links to the MEF. 
Snyder Rini, who had been Sogavare's Finance minister and had approved up to 
SI$80 million in duty remissions (SIBC 15 December 2001), became the new 
deputy prime minister. In addition, a number of former MEF leaders were 
appointed as ministers, raising the spectre of deepening collusion between 
government leaders and militant elements. They included former member of the 
MEF supreme council and Honiara businessman, Alex Bartlett, who was 
appointed foreign minister. The post of minister for Police, National Security 
and Justice was given to another former militant, Benjamin Una. He had 
previously commanded one of the Australian-donated patrol boats used to attack 
Guadalcanal positions after the coup. Another ex-militant, Daniel Fa'afauna, 
was appointed minister for Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment. 
The policy priorities of the new administration were the restoration of law and 
order and revival of the economy (Sydney Morning Herald 18 December 2001). 
These were also the conditions for securing much-needed international 
development assistance. On the law and order front, this meant getting the 
police force working again. Initial signs were not promising. No arrests had 
been made for a number of outstanding crimes, despite the fact that the identity 
of the suspects was common knowledge. These included the alleged killers of 
the former IFM leader, Selwyn Saki, whose murder had derailed the review of 
the TP A. They also included the person responsible for killing a New Zealand 
consultant in Honiara in mid-February (Solomon Star 13 February 2002). Prime 
Minister Kemakeza approached the Australian and New Zealand governments 
requesting overseas police to work alongside SI officers (PINA Nius Online 24 
March 2002). Australia declined but has continued its institutional 
strengthening with the Solomon Islands police, using advisers rather than 
officers in line positions. New Zealand has agreed recently to send ten officers 
to work with local police (SIBC 19 August 2002), while the United Kingdom 
government will provide a replacement for the current police commissioner 
when his contract expires later in the year. 
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At the beginning of 2002 several incidents involving Bougainvillean gunmen 
were reported from Western province, including a spectacular shooting spree in 
Gizo township (Solomon Star 4 February 2002). In late February, two Malaitan 
special constables were allegedly killed by Bougainvilleans in Noro, Western 
Province. This immediately led to retaliatory acts by Malaitan ex-militants 
against Westerners in Honiara. Matters relating to the presence of 
Bougainvilleans in the Western Province, and also of Solomon Islanders in 
Bougainville, are now the subject of border talks between authorities in Honiara 
and Port Moresby (PINA Nius Online 6 March 2002). 
The latest, and ostensibly the final, deadline for the surrendering of weapons 
under the TP A expired on 31 May 2002 and, according to the Peace Monitoring 
Council, resulted in the surrender of more guns and ammunition than any of its 
predecessors. While no exact or reliable figures are available, the weapons 
surrendered included a number of high-powered weapons. The . majority of 
weapons originally stolen from police armouries, however, remain at large 
(SIBC 11 June 2002). The Australian-led lPMT has been phased out, with 
Australian assistance now being directed at strengthening the Peace Monitoring 
Council (PacNews 22 February 2002). The rationale for the withdrawal was 
that the lPMT has fulfilled its monitoring mandate under the Townsville Peace 
Agreement. 
Several meetings were held between a senior government envoy and the 
maverick Guadalcanal leader Harold Keke on the Weather Coast earlier in the 
year. There had been promising indications that Keke and his Guadalcanal 
Liberation Front (GLF) were preparing to enter the peace process that they had 
hitherto rejected. However, this progress came to a sudden halt after the 
'massacre' of ten Malaitans who had travelled to the Weather Coast in early 
June in order to capture or kill Keke (Pacific Islands Report 28 June 2002). The 
exact details of what happened, including the identity of the parties behind the 
raid, remain unclear, although the killings have been confirmed. Keke has 
become a ruthless and unpredictable warlord and his Weather Coast territory has 
become a no-go zone for outsiders, including the police and other government 
representatives. His latest outrage was the brutal murder in August of a 
government minister and member for the South Guadalcanal constituency, 
Father Augustine Geve. Keke has claimed that Father Geve was killed because 
he had misused funds intended for his constituency (PINA Nius Online 23 
August 2002). Keke's reign of terror in south Guadalcanal constitutes a major 
obstacle to peace, and continues to impede the disarmament process. Following 
Geve's murder, the Police minister appealed to Australia and New Zealand for 
assistance in apprehending Keke (PacNews 27 August 2002). 
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Althoug.h much remains to be done in the area of reconciliation, several key 
players m the events of June 2000 have made gestures in this direction. Andrew 
Nori, the former MEF spokesperson, hosted a reconciliation ceremony with 
some of the members of the former SIAC government that he had helped oust 
from office (Solomon Star 12 February 2002). Foreign Minister Alex Bartlett, a 
f~rmer m~mber of the ~F supreme council, has apologized in parliament for 
his ro~~ i_n the conflict and expressed his willingness to engage in the 
reconc1bation process (SIBC 5 April 02). While understandably greeted with 
extreme scepticism in many quarters, these gestures might prompt other players 
to review their personal roles in the events of the past few years. Attempts at 
reconciliation and peace-building at the grassroots level have been more low-
key and have been facilitated by churches, women's groups and community 
leaders. !he Melanesian Brothers, who were courageous agents of peace during 
the confhct, have continued their role in the area of reconciliation. 
In addition to law and order and the peace process, the other major focus of 
gov~rnment attention has been the economy. By the beginning of the year, 
pubbc debt had reached critical levels with rapidly diminishing foreign reserves 
and a total outstanding debt burden of SI$1.3 billion (Solomon Star 30 July 
2002). Immediately after the elections, Kemakeza announced his intention of 
redu.cing the gov~rnment payroll from SI$200 million to SI$i50 million though 
detatls on how this was to be achieved remained vague. A visiting mission from 
the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund, made clear their unwillingness to provide further funds until the Solomon 
Islands had settled outstanding arrears (Solomon Star 15 March 2002). Finance 
Minister. Michael. Maina introduced a tight budget in March that was, among 
other things, designed to address the immediate concerns of the multilateral 
a~encies and donor community. He also caught everyone off guard by 
stmultaneously announcing an immediate 25 per cent devaluation of the SI 
dollar. While this move received support from the Central Bank, it split the 
Ke~eza cab~net. Strongest opposition came from Snyder Rini and his group 
of mdependents who formed the largest bloc in the government. Under 
mounting political pressure, Kemakeza sacked Maina and the devaluation was 
sub~e~uently revoked (PINA Nius Online 4 April 2002). More recently, 
Mama s replacement has proposed replacing the SI dollar with Australian 
currency, despite being advised against this by the International Monetary Fund 
(Pacnews 29 August 2002). 
As the economic situation has deteriorated, the government has become more 
desperate to raise revenue and cut expenditure. In the first six months of 2002, 
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it had allegedly overspent by SI$28 million dollars on salaries and wages alone 
(PINA Nius Online 31 July 2002). Attempts to reduce spending by proposing the 
termination of 1,300 public servants has met with strong opposition from the 
trade unions (PINA Nius Online 30 July 2002). Teachers, medical staff, airport 
employees and others have resorted to rolling strikes in protest over non-
payment of wages. Amid rumours that the final tranche of the Taiwanese loan 
to pay compensation had arrived, claimants laid siege to the Treasury offices 
and razor wire has now been erected around key government offices (SIBC 5 
August 2002). 
A number of ill-conceived fund-raising schemes have been proposed and then 
abandoned in the face of strong opposition. For example, in April reports 
surfaced that the government was considering selling 80 per cent of equity in the 
Solomon Islands Development Bank to Melbourne-based company, ACC-
AMCO (SIBC 11 April 2002). A year earlier, an adviser to the Sogavare 
government had signed a memorandum of agreement with AMCO that would 
have provided the company with extensive rights to engage in mining, tourism, 
logging, fishing, banking, printing, and a range of service activities. The 
agreement did not proceed after the Central Bank cast doubts on the company's 
credentials. The adviser in question had since become minister for Commerce 
in the Kemakeza government and was lobbying vigorously on behalf of the 
company. The planned sale was eventually shelved as a result of vigorous 
opposition by, among others, the board of the Development Bank (Solomon Star 
23 April 2002). 
Even more controversial was the proposal to dump toxic waste from Taiwan on 
the island of Makira. This was another scheme carried over from the Sogavare 
administration (PINA Nius Online 7 February 2002). It aroused immediate 
opposition from a range of groups, including senior public servants, opposition 
politicians, community groups, and local and international environmental 
groups. After considerable wavering, Prime Minister Kemakeza announced that 
his government was opposed to any form of toxic dumping in the Solomon 
Islands (SICA Press Release 18 June 2002). There have also been allegations 
that a Taiwan-based company has been selling Solomon Islands passports in 
Asia (SIBC 11 May 2002). 
In retrospect, the high expectations in the lead-up to the 2001 election appear to 
have been misplaced. Ousting the discredited and compromised Sogavare 
administration was by no means the sole issue. The more daunting political 
challenge was to put in place a government capable of providing firm and 
independent leadership. This required severing the hold that certain parties to 
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the 2000 coup had been able to exercise over Sogavare and his ministerial 
colleagues ~d tha~ ~ad contributed in significant ways to the deepening political 
and econonuc cns1s. The composition of the newly-formed government 
suggeste~ that this was unlikely to happen and subsequent developments have 
borne this out. There has been a reluctance to take hard decisions and a 
readiness to follow the path of least resistance. The coercive arm of the state _ 
the police_ force - remains incapacitated and serious crimes, including murder, 
go u~pumshed. In large parts of rural Guadalcanal, the rule of law has 
effectively ~ollap~ed and been replaced by brutal family feuds waged between 
former ethnic alltes. As funds for wages and services dry up, the arrival of 
comp~nsation from Taiwan generates a feeding frenzy among claimants 
(g_enume and bogus) and inevitably leads to further divisions and conflict. 
Disenchantment with the formal political process has now reached dangerous 
new levels. 
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CONVERGING ON THE ARC OF INSTABILITY? 
THE FALL OF BARAK SOPE AND THE SPECTRE OF 
A COUP IN VANUATU 
Michael Morgans 
The constitutional crisis which erupted in Vanuatu in May 2001 initially 
prompted fears that Vanuatu might follow the examples of the Solomon Islands 
and Fiji and descend into social unrest, and possibly violent conflict. The 
greater danger was that the ailing administration of Barak Tame Sope 
Mau'utamate would mobilize the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) to consolidate 
its hold on power. 
The crisis was triggered by an attempted motion of no confidence in Prime 
Minister Barak Sope, authored jointly by the Vanua'aku Pati (VP) and Sope's 
former coalition partner, the Union of Moderate Parties (UMP). The pressing 
issue for the Vanua'aku Pati was the country's worsening financial situation, 
especially in light of a clandestine deal between Sope and Indian Thai 
businessman Amerendra Nath Ghosh, involving the issue of $US300 million 
from the Reserve Bank. The UMP had defected to the opposition in the month 
before the commencement of the parliamentary session. For almost two months 
during its scheduled first session for 2001 the Vanuatu Parliament was 
incapacitated because the Speaker, Paul Ren Tari, refused to allow debate on the 
motion. The Vanuatu Supreme Court upheld the validity of the motion, but 
Sope claimed that his coalition was the victim of foreign interference and a 
political conspiracy between the government and the state law offices that 
culminated in a 'libellous' motion of no confidence. Throughout, Sope and his 
allies maintained pressure on VP and UMP backbenchers in the hope of 
inducing defections by marginalized MPs for whom personal allegiance might 
be considered a tradable commodity. Despite consistent pressure, the 
government of Edward Natapei emerged victorious from the constitutional crisis 
and Vanuatu remained peaceful, although the events set in train a year of further 
political manoeuvring which culminated in the arrest and conviction of Sope on 
charges of forgery and the intervention of elements of the police and the VMF in 
national politics. 
1 I would like to thank Daniel Oakman, Jenny Brown, Donald Denoon and Ron May for their comments on 
drafts of this paper. 
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Since 1988 political stability in Vanuatu has been challenged regularly, but the 
country has neither yielded to violent conflict nor suffered an effective coup 
d' etar, despite the predictions of policy analysts and regional journalists. 
Nonetheless, since the beginning of 2001 government perfonnance has been 
undermined by political flux and ongoing disquiet amongst the disciplined 
forces. Beginning with the constitutional crisis of March-April 2001, this paper 
addresses recent unrest in Vanuatu against the backdrop of domestic political 
manoeuvring, poor economic performance, pressure for reform and the spectre 
of a coup. It argues that despite the volatile nature of recent events in Vanuatu, 
which is seen increasingly as part of the arc of instability, the coalition 
government of Edward Natapei has successfully countered dissident internal 
forces. 
The trigger 
In the weeks before the first ordinary sitting of parliament for 2001 was 
scheduled to begin, a split emerged in the coalition government of Barak Sope. 
In early March the government's second largest faction, the UMP, defected to 
the opposition. UMP President Serge Vohor claimed that his party had been 
marginalized by Sope's administration: in particular, the UMP's policies on 
education were being ignored, and Sope had been unable to address the global 
drop in copra prices which severely affected the UMP's mainly rural 
constituents. Their concerns about the policies of the coalition leadership 
exacerbated the feeling that the UMP was not adequately represented in the 
Council of Ministers. When Vohor demanded a cabinet reshuffle to rectify this, 
Sope refused (Trading Post 28 March 2001 ). The situation was made more 
galling to the UMP executive because it had agreed not to run candidates against 
their coalition partners in the Santo by-election in February 2001. All member 
parties in the coalition government had agreed to back the National United Party 
(NUP) candidate, Leo Tamata, after the death of the incumbent NUP MP, Anas 
Tinwako. Having maintained coalition unity to assure representation for the 
NUP, but refused increased representation for his own party, Vohor canvassed 
his options. 
In early March, without consulting the UMP (or the attorney general), Sope 
signed an agreement with the Italian company, Volani, to develop a cattle 
project on Santo for a reported vt424 million ($US2.9 million). Santo is the 
heartland of the UMP. Vohor was backing the rival Mondragon Group' s bid to 
develop the Big Bay area. It has been claimed that Mondragon donated 
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$US 150,000 to the UMP. Although the UMP Jost two MPs during the 
defection, Sope's parliamentary majority evaporated.
9 
The motion 
The parliament was scheduled to commence its first ordi~ary ses~ion on 26 
March 2001, but it was delayed by a walkout by _Ya~ua aku Pau ~embers, 
ostensibly in protest over the railroading of leg1slat1on ~o expedite voter 
registration for the upcoming Municipal Elections for Port Vila. .on 26 Mar~h 
the UMP formally defected and the government "':as forc~d to withdraw ~I its 
bills. The defection set in train events that would mcapacitate the first ordinary 
session for 2001 through boycotts, walkouts and court cases. 
While no government bills were addressed during the sitting, four private 
members' bills were put before the house for consideration. Pi:imary amongst 
these was the motion of no confidence in Prime Minister Sope, signed. by the 27 
VP and UMP MPs. Tari and his deputies were also tar~~ted for motion~ of no 
confidence, although the standing orders make no provisions for censunng the 
speaker. 
A motion of no confidence is usually a straightforwar~ affair, simp~y stati~~ that 
the majority of members has lost faith in th~ capacity ~f. the pnme ~1ster. 
However, the motion in question included details of Sope s mvolveme~t m three 
major financial scandals during his parliamentary career - two of which would 
have extended Vanuatu's already sizeable external debt and emasc~l~ted ~he 
economy- and asserted an improper relationship between.Sope's admmist.ration 
and Dinh van Than, the naturalized Vietnamese businessman who ts the 
president of the NUP. The speaker of the parliament, NUP MP for. Maewo, Paul 
R Tari refused to allow debate on the motion. Observers beheved that ~he 
m:ion ~as a tactical blunder, allowing Sope to instigate defarnat1~n 
proceedings against its 27 signatories. However, the Suprem~ Co~rt uph~ld its 
validity, stating that because none of the_ c~arges had been atred m pubhc, the 
motion was protected by parliamentary pnv1lege. 
When it became clear that he had lost his parliamentary . ma1onty '. Sope 
announced that the Council of Ministers would adv~se the president to d~ssolve 
parliament. Sope promised to resign if the president r~fused. . ~espite the 
expectation amongst the NUP executive - and the Co~nc~l of .Mimster~ - that 
President John Bani would vote according to the party s drrect1ves (Bant was a 
' Paul Telukluk (Malakula) joined the Grin Pati [Green Party). Irene Bongnaim (Ambrym) joined the Vanuatu 
Republican Pany of former prime minister Maxime Carlot Korman. 
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founding member of the NUP), the president refused to dissolve parliament and 
instead followed the advice of the State Law Office. Sope refused to resign. 
Immediately, the VP executive requested Chief Justice Vincent Lunapek to 
allow parliament to be reconvened to consider the motion of no confidence and 
elect a new government (Trading Post 4 April 2001). On Friday 6 April 
Lunapek ruled that the speaker had acted improperly and ordered him to recall 
parliament to consider the motion (Supreme Court of Vanuatu 2001). When 
parliament reconvened, the speaker delayed the tabling of the motion, pending 
corrections and amendments, despite the fact that his office and the Office of the 
Clerk had already approved the motion for passage through the house, before its 
introduction. Only when it was made clear to Tari that if he went to gaol on 
contempt charges he could no longer be a member of parliament did he 
apologize to the court and agree to recall the house. At 7 p.m. on 13 April, 
heavily guarded by police, Tari reconvened parliament and, following a 
government walkout, Edward Natapei, the president of the VP, was voted in as 
prime minister. 
When parliament met again on 7 May, Tari suspended six members of the new 
government, including Prime Minister Natapei and Deputy Prime Minster Serge 
Yohor, for breaches of the standing orders and the constitution. The remaining 
twenty-one government MPs walked out in solidarity. The speaker claimed that 
by taking him to court in April the government MPs had breached standing 
orders and the constitution, but the Supreme Court again overturned his ruling. 
Once again he was directed to reconvene parliament, or face charges of 
contempt and a six-month gaol sentence. Undaunted, on Monday 14 May the 
speaker (who possessed the only key to the parliamentary chamber) failed to 
appear. Further, Tari made several public comments against the judiciary and 
the new government, and openly sided with Sope's regime. Despite being 
informed of their obligations by the State Law Office, Tari's deputies refused to 
help open the chamber. Access to the house was gained when a ladder was 
lowered from the Public Gallery. 
That evening Natapei, on the advice of the attorney general, directed the police 
to arrest the speaker and his two deputies, Irene Bongnaim and Henry Yauko. 
They were apprehended early next morning - the speaker at the residence of 
Barak Sope. Despite strong criticisms from Sope and the opposition, parliament 
elected a new speaker, MP for Efate and former prime minister, Donald 
Kalpokas Masikevanua. The new government came to power with a majority of 
one (26-25) in the 52-seat parliament. 
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. and his allies probed the VP and UMP 
During the turmoil of 2001 Sope urf d that Sope had won back power 
backbenches for weaknesses. Rum~u~s ~ i~~~al divisions, had disintegrated. 
and that the VP, supposedly wrahc e y targeted for bribes. Foster Rakom, a 
l al backbenc ers were f 
Simultaneous y, sever 1 1 . ed that he had been approached by one.o 
Francophone VP~ from Me e,hc air;; d vt5 million, a ministerial portfolio, 
Dinh Van Than' s heutenants w o ~t erehurch house if he would join Sope 
and the completion of a commurn y c as not expected to be re-elected in 
(Trading Post 30 March ~001) .. Rako~ ; defecting. (Rakom's bid for re-
2002 and he stood to gam cons1derab Y Y sful) To avoid confrontation in 
election in the May 2002 elections was ~nsucces te~pted the VP relocated its 
Port Vila, and ensure th~t no backbe~cD e~al~e~alpokas'; community' Lelepa. 
headquarters to the relatJve safety o o 
There were no defections. 
. . nore ressures from their own marginalized 
Nevertheless the VP/UMP did not ig KP Maki the UMP member for Epi, 
'd A ·1 ·t appeared that ora • . . 
members. In rm pn 
1 
. confidence Maki received significant 
might defect and support ~ motion ~f n~om Willie jimmy (NUP). (Jimmy was 
funding for his 1998 electton c~a~gnd f . t the NUP in February 2001 ). 
. h UMP unul his e ect1on o d 
a faction leader in t e L .Ile MP George Wells (VP) ha S I ·med that uganv1 . 
The same week, ope c at b kin ~ his 2002 re-election campaign to 
requested vt8 million ($US 54,~)d a~ d ~eo~legation but later that day it was 
defect to the MPP. Wells pub!ic \a~m~ecided not to ~re-select Wells as VP 
revealed that the V~ executive ch 2002 elections. (The party subsequentl~ 
candidate fo~ Lug~:1lle for~~:~: okas was installed as speaker, Kora Maki 
rescinded this dec1S1on). W d G p Wells the second deputy speaker. became his deputy speaker an eorge 
. . . d May 2001 remains obscure. His 
What motivated Tari m April l an f the parliament and of the principle 
understanding of the laws and regu at,on: ?s Westminster-style government was 
of the separation of power~ ~nd~r ~~u~ u ·1 judgement, Chief Justice Lunapek 
queried throughout the ~sis. n I ~ tion is self-evidently ... entrusted 
noted that the 'interpretatton ~f ~e cons: thro~~h the Constitution' (Supreme 
to the Court by th~. people o J~~~ c:~colm, conceded during the April court 
Court 2001). Tan s lawyer, h ct• ·ssed the motion of no confidence. 
case that the speaker had erred w~n. ~ t~~hat the courts had no right to bully 
Yet for two mon~s after the ~~e an r~:'ected him. A week after the trial Tari's 
him because parliame~tary p~vlleg~ p .th his client, stating, 'our client has 
counsel terminated his relau.on~h1p wJin Post 14 April 2001). When the 
refused to listen to our adv~e ~~ ~barges against the three speakers in 
Supreme Court final!~ heard e sd. ~n d the case ruling that at the time of 
December 2001, Jusuce Coventry isrmsse ' 
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their arrest they were covered by Article 27 of the constitution because 
parliament was still in session, but he cautioned them against abusing their 
privileges.10 In his judgement, Coventry noted that parliamentary privilege 
'does not mean that a person can do what they like ... without people having 
recourse to the court' (Trading Post l December 2001). 
Financial crisis 
The VP predicated the ouster of Sope on the latter's involvement in clandestine 
financial schemes, in particular the agreement with Amerendra Nath Ghosh. 
Ghosh had arrived in Port Vqa in February 2000 with what was described as 
'possibly the world's largest ruby', which he intended to 'donate' to the people 
of Vanuatu. He promised to initiate a project to seal the road around Efate, 
build a walled complex for the Council of Ministers, and negotiate with foreign 
consortia to build a new international airport (Nasara 14 April 2001). Ghosh 
reputedly was awarded an honorary consulship for Laos and the ambassadorship 
in Thailand (Radio Vanuatu 19 April 2001). He also claimed to have been given 
petroleum and mineral exploration and fishing rights, royalty free. In return for 
the ruby, it was reported that Ghosh was to receive $US300 million in bearer 
bonds from the Reserve Bank. This was equal to 140 per cent of Vanuatu's 
gross domestic product, and had Sope issued the bonds, Vanuatu's external debt 
would have quadrupled (Australian Financial Review 26 February 2001). 
Sope· claimed that revenue generated by the government's joint ventures with 
Ghosh would be used to settle outstanding debts with the police and VMF and 
fully compensate people for losses incurred during the Santo Rebellion in 1980. 
In October 2000 he made the first payment to the police, reputedly from these 
earnings. At the time, the acting police commissioner, Arthur Caulton, averred 
that this marked a turning point in relations between the police and the 
government, but great uncertainty remained (Trading Post 8 September 2001). 
Natapei now claims that the payment was made from savings in the recurrent 
police budget of 1999, accrued under the Kalpokas administration (March 1998-
November 1999). Both the police and VMF maintain that the government's 
debt to them is yet to be fully acquitted. 
The Ghosh affair refocused attention on Sope's involvement in a succession of 
potentially disastrous financial deals. Sope was centrally involved in the 1996 
Swanson deal, when as Finance minister he had approved the issue of 
promissory notes for tens of millions of dollars to an Australian businessman, 
10 It slates: 'No member of Parliament may be arrested, detained. prosecuted or proceeded against in respect of 
opinions given or votes cast by him in Parliament in lhe exercise of his office' (Constitution, Art.27, Sect.I). 
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t d a 250 per cent profit on their issue. 
Peter Swanson. Swanson had gu~an e~nister Korman annulled the deal and 
On advice from Scotland yard, Prime l d after three months by presidential 
had Swanson arrested (Swanson was re eas~ atu National Provident Fund to 
pardon). Also in 1996 he had forced the h an: . bane-based Cybank Internet 
transfer vt27 million ($US 180,000) to t e ns 
banking company' none of which was recovered. 
Committee on Investigations had 
In March 2001 a report to t~e US ~ermaal nemno\ey-laundering centre. While 
tu s an mternauon N · named Vanua a I . f Vanuatu's economy, atapet 
international focus was on the re~ au~~d ~s an economic manager. During 
mounted an atta~~ on Sope'.s perso~et~:n 1996 and 1997, Sope had failed to 
his tenure as numster of Fmance al b d t While Sope claimed to have 
provide a development budget or ans anb_lnli~ ($uUgSel ?o million) much of the debt 
· ' debt by vt2 1 on ' Chi reduced his country s . f the agreement by the nese 
reduction actually came about because in~luding that which had paid for the 
government to write-off several loansv~80 million ($US2.7 million) soft lo!in. 
Parliament house - and grant a new ai· . took office in 1999 there was . . d h h n Sope's co itton . Natape1 claune t at w . e. million) in reserve. The Natape1 
approximately vt200 nulhon . ($US·~h4 a monthly overdraft of vt400 million 
government is currently_ working. ':"1 Joe Carlo revealed that the government 
($US2.8 million). VP Finance M1~1ster maintain the cash flow until the end of 
would be looking for other alternatives to t reform the Vanuatu taxation 
2001. The former government h~d take~ stepthse ogovemment's revenue base, 
. h . t tion of improving . Id 
system with t e m en amblin bill, which was calculated to y1e 
particularly by the approval of a. g. g th. to date no revenue has 
over vt240 million ($US1.6 nulhon) per mon , 
eventuated (Radio Vanuatu 21May2001). 
as onl partially to blame for Vanuatu's 
Sope' s maverick manage~ent style w h fl y problems that Natapei highlighted 
. · ·1 tton The cas - ow . · I precanous econonuc s1 ua ". . venue and lack of econonuc sttmu us, 
resulted primarily from dec_hnmg re . educed confidence. Lack of 
although Sope's overspending und~mably rt rpn'ses entrenched political 
d. · with pnvate en e • . government coor mat1on . and poor global pnces for . . and taxation revenues, 
instability, dechmng customs 1 "b ted to the weakening of the economy. 
Vanuatu's cash crops, have al c?ntn u nue base - which relies heavily 
Donors have highlighted Vanuatu.s narr~w reveas an area for immediate reform. 
. . l and financial services - . 2001 on tounsm. agncu ture nu'c review undertaken m • . . h ADB • most recent econo • . 
The emphasis m t e ~ . . 1 d fisheries . . . promote foreign was to. "quickly co~erc1ahse ag~cu ::~ : boost· economic growth' and 
investment in plantation forestry ~ o tions for mining (ADB 2001: 3). 
consider the possibility of explonng op 
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Statistics for the first half of 2002 confirmed a decline in agricultural production 
and exports as well as a decline in tourist arrivals, compounding the negative 
economic growth in 2001 (DFAT 2002). The challenge to investor confidence 
which Sope's leadership style entailed obscured how deeply rooted Vanuatu's 
economic woes were, but the vigour of national political manoeuvring distracted 
from long-term policy considerations. 
Sope's political rhetoric was loaded with references to the damage that the 
Comprehensive Reform Progranune (CRP) (the structural adjustment 
programme sponsored by the Asian Development Bank), was doing to Vanuatu. 
At its inception in 1997, Sope had stated that the CRP would cause suffering to 
the people of Vanuatu (Trading Post 17 September 1997), although in office he 
was forced to grant the project tacit support. By May 2001 Sope had distilled 
his sentiments further. The CRP, he stated, 'only serves the interests of 
Australia and New Zealand. Over 70 foreign advisers are here under the CRP 
and they are all paid by the Vanuatu government under the ADB loan ... it is 
ridiculous' (Trading Post 19 May 2001). Apprehension that Vanuatu's 
sovereignty might have been jeopardized by the CRP has been fuelled by 
sketchy reports of the negative impact of the structural adjustment programme in 
Papua New Guinea, and has been an enduring theme in political rhetoric in 
Vanuatu since 1997. Although Natapei has vowed to adhere to the CRP in view 
of the poor financial position of the country, comments from senior members of 
his administration about the dominant role of foreign advisers in the programme 
have become more pronounced. Minister for Foreign Affairs Jean Alain Mahe 
(UMP) noted that Vanuatu's financial difficulties are compounded by the 
'policy of austerity translated by the implementation of the CRP mainly advised 
by Australian consultants' (Trading Post 25 August 2001). 
Despite his reaffirmation of support for the CRP, Natapei has proposed a much 
shorter list of achievable reforms and has posited a much greater emphasis on 
grassroots people. There is a growing criticism of the effects of Westminster 
democracy in Vanuatu, which may affect the CRP's implementation, despite 
transparent domestic support for reform. The call for more home grown 
strategies and systems to be adopted has been fuelled by the perceived failures 
of the democratic state. For example, the director of the Pacific Resources 
Concerns Centre in Suva, Hilda Lini (a former national parliamentarian), has 
called on Melanesian women to renounce the 'western response to the 
Melanesian state of conflict' and design a new philosophy to guide the people of 
Vanuatu. Democracy, she stated, 'will continue to corrupt Melanesia resulting 
in the continuous uncontrolled crime, violence and poverty' (Port Vila Presse 20 
October 2001). Fuelling these sentiments, Sope attempted to position himself as 
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the 'authentic' voice of grassroots Vanuatu, but Natapei guaranteed that his 
administration's reformist policies (which are consistent with the CRP) would 
not compromise Vanuatu's autonomy and would ensure that bogus deals such as 
the one Sope had entered into with Ghosh will not jeopardize Vanuatu's weak 
economy in the future. 
The spectre of a coup 
While events in Vanuatu's fractious political history (starting with the Santo 
rebellion in 1980) have often generated muted bemusement in the region, 
Vanuatu is haunted by the spectres of a coup and/or ethnic disintegration. 11 The 
tragic outbreak of ethnic violence which occasioned the collapse of the state in 
the Solomon Islands in 1998-2000, continuing social unrest in Papua New 
Guinea, and the ethnically-motivated coups in Fiji in 1987 and 2000 have 
inspired observers to place Vanuatu on a shared trajectory of social 
disintegration with its Melanesian neighbours (see Reilly 2000; Maher 2000). 
The Trading Post reported that on 13 April 2001 - the night that the motion of 
no confidence was finally debated - Sope and Internal Affairs Minister 
Bamabus Tabi (NUP, Pentecost) had approached the acting police 
commissioner, Arthur Caulton, requesting him to enact emergency powers in the 
light of the political turmoil and constitutional crisis, and to declare martial law 
until further notice (Trading Post 18 April 2001). Acting Commissioner 
Caulton refused the request because the political situation did not warrant a state 
of emergency and no critical law and order problem was apparent. Sope's 
attempt to use the police to entrench his position raised fears that a coup was 
imminent. Despite strong links between Sope's Melanesian Progressive Party 
deputy, Sato Kilman12 and the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF), the VMF and 
police remained neutral. In part, this might be traced to the circumstances 
surrounding the abduction of President Jean Marie Leye Lenelcau by VMF 
officers in 1996. After striking for several weeks without success, VMF officers 
had flown the president to Malekula to meet Sope, who was then the Finance 
aumster. The VMF was at the time claiming $US980,000 in outstanding 
allowances. Sope promised both an amnesty for the leaders of the 'industrial 
coup' and the payment of outstanding allowances, but his failure to fully 
11 Barak Sopc first attempted to seize power in 1988 when he was sworn in as interim prime minister by then 
President Ali George Sokomanu (Sopc's uncle) after Sokomanu had dissolved parliament. Sokomanu, Sopc and 
their co-conspirators were arrested on charges of mutiny and seditious conspiracy, although the charges were 
overturned on the grounds of misuial and insufficient evidence. A similar unsuccessful attempt at political coup 
d'etat was mounted in 1995 by Fr Walter Lini and Serge Vohor (see Ambrose 1996). 
12 Kilman is a former commanding officer of the VMF. In the aftcnnath of the constitutional crisis in May, 
Kilman (MP for Malekula) broke away to form the People's Progressive Pany. 
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account for his earlier promises has undermined any residual allegiances he 
might have had with VMF officers. 13 
Throughout the constitutional crisis, Sope attempted to position himself as the 
authentic voice of grassroots niVanuatu. He claimed that he had been ousted by 
a political conspiracy implicating foreign diplomatic missions and senior 
VP/UMP coalition ministers. His deputy, Willy Jimmy, drew attention to the 
fact that the public prosecutor, who had issued the warrant for the arrest of the 
speaker and his deputies, is married to Natapei's minister of Health, Clement 
L~o (T~ading Post 19 May 2001). When Sope's supporters suggested forcibly 
remstatmg the speaker and his deputies, Sope had counselled them to remain 
caln:1- though he implored them to 'take to the streets' to force out interfering 
foreigners shoul~ the need arise (Trading Post 21 April 2001). In late April 
~001 ~ope. clanned ~at the .Austr~an High Commission was directly 
mterfenng m Vanuatu s domestic pohtJ.cs because Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) had tapped the phones of government MPs. Jn fact, the AFP were 
inve~tigati~g a_ ~ons~gnment of hero~ supposedly missing in Vanuatu, following 
a seizure m F1J1, with the cooperation of the Vanuatu Police. Commissioner 
Bon~ stated that their presence had been kept secret to avoid any tip-offs, and 
was m no way related to the political turmoil. 
In September 2001 Natapei stated his intention to investigate allegations against 
Sope of contempt of court and misappropriation of public funds (Vanuatu 
Weekly/Hebdomadaire 1 September 2001), but when police tried to carry out a 
search warrant against Sope they were deterred by Sope's Ifiran supporters who 
were armed with knives and axes. While Sope eventually accepted a court 
s.ummons on charges arising from the issue of bank guarantees, it appeared 
likely that he would mobilize grass-roots support in the event of his political 
career be~ng undermined by criminal prosecution. 
Sope h~ thrived. in the arena of ~ational politics, and broadened his support base 
from his home island of lfua, m Port Vila harbour, to the entire Rural Efate 
electo~ate. Sope i~ ac~o~ledged as an astute leader whose leadership skills 
saw him elected pnme numster although his party held only four seats in the 52-
seat parliament. ~et ~upport in If~a ~as waned since the late 1990s, specifically 
because the negative tmpacts of his mvolvement in scandals such as the Ghosh 
deal. ~ad ~een consistently and convincingly highlighted by the Natapei 
admimstratJ.on. In July 2002 the Supreme Court of Vanuatu sentenced Sope to 
i; Key office~ have been paid settlements, but the periodic refusal of ministers to approve payments. the Jaclc o f 
funds to acqwt such payments, the lack of records of what is o wed, and claims by officers who are not entitled to 
allowances, have all delayed the settlement of the issue. 
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three years in jail on two convictions for forging bogus bank guarantees worth 
$US23 million - a $US5 million bank guarantee for the Vanuatu Invesnnent 
Corporation Limited and a $US 18 million guarantee for Dynamic Growth 
Projects Pty Ltd (Port Vila Presse 19 July 2002). Although Sope' s supporters 
attempted to mount demonstrations for his release in August 2002, they could 
rouse little public support because the chief of Ifua, Mantoi Kalsakau III, argued 
against the demonstrations. The island of Ifua - Sope's core constituency - has 
shifted its allegiance behind UMP MP for Efate Rural, Stephen Kalsakau. 
Despite initial fears that it would foment civil dissent and make him a martyr, 
Sope's imprisonment has been met with indifference. 
While the government had its attention focussed on defeating Sope, the 
appointment of Mae! Apisai as Commissioner of Police provoked the most 
serious challenge to the government's legitimacy since it had taken office. On 4 
August 2002 police officers acting under direction from a troika of senior 
officers - Eric Pakoa, superintendent of police for the Southern Islands, the head 
of the VMF, Lieutenant Colonel Api Jack Marikembo, and the acting 
commissioner of police, Holi Simon - arrested the fifteen members of the Police 
Services Commission (PSC) on charges of 'seditious conspiracy' arising from 
procedural irregularities in Apisai's appointment. Following Apisai's 
appointment, senior staff, including Marikembo (an unsuccessful applicant for 
the position of commissioner of police) refused to carry out orders issued by 
Apisai. Arguably, Apisai was appointed to purge anti-government elements 
from within the police and VMF, but his subordinates forcibly pre-empted their 
censure. At the time of his arrest, the new commissioner had prepared, but not 
issued, disciplinary procedures against Marikembo and other insubordinate 
officers. 
In the early hours of 4 August 2002, a group of Vanuatu Mobile Force troops, 
using the operational title 'Operation Procedure 2002' , arrested Apisai and the 
entire PSC, including the attorney general, the secretary to the president, and the 
ombudsman. Despite the support of the majority of the VMF, members of the 
police force had met Apisai 's appointment with great scepticism because the 
PSC had not scrutinized his application. Vanuatu's disciplined forces had been 
without an official commander since the retirement of Commissioner Peter Bong 
in 2001. Jenny Ligo, commission member and president of the Vanuatu Council 
of Women, stated that the chair of the PSC, Michael Taun, had bowed to 
political influence from within the government, but not from Minister of Internal 
Affairs Joe Natuman, which sparked fears of an internal struggle within the VP. 
(Deputy Prime Minister Serge Vohor (UMP, Santo) later took charge of the 
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policeNMF portfolio from Natuman under direction from Prime Minister 
Natapei, who was attending the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Fiji). 
~n 8 August Justice Roger Coventry overturned Apisai's appointment and 
directed. the PSC to se~e on an acting commissioner as soon as possible in 
preparation for the appointment of a commissioner once the PSC had considered 
a .fres~ round ?f applicants. Coventry's decision was arguably oriented towards 
diffusing tens10n between the government and the troika of dissident officers. 
The PSC' s guidelines for selecting the police commissioner are vague, the 
apparent , politi.cal interference in the selection process notwithstanding. 
Coventry s rulmg allayed government fears of further action during the 
Melanesian Arts Festival and Fes Napuan (18-28 August), but when the 
g~vemment launched a procedural counter-strike fears of civil strife were again 
raised. !he arrest of Holi Simon and Api Jack Marikembo on 26 August 2002 
was earned out after the public prosecutor laid charges of mutiny and incitement 
to mutiny against nineteen senior VMF and police officers arising from the 
initial arrest of the PSC. 
The arrests inspired reports that Natapei had gone into hiding, while heated 
exchanges erupted between 'rival groups of police' (Sydney Morning Herald 27 
August 2002). The factionalism between the police and the VMF which 
emerg~d during acute political instability in 1996 stirred anxiety amongst donor 
countnes that party rivalry might escalate to organized violence between 
factions of the disciplined forces. Increased donor support for law and order and 
policing projects, including the establishment of the Joint Police Operations 
Co~n~ (JP?C), was informed by the need to break this perceived 
organizational nvalry . . Although the success of these initiatives remains to be 
proven, until 2002 there had been no serious breakdown in relations between the 
police and the VMF. 
The Sydney Morning Herald story elicited an angry response from government 
spokesman Daniel Bangtor, who decried the media's inaccurate reporting and 
moved. ~e governm~nt to lodge a complaint with the Australian High 
C~mm1s~1~n: ~t the t~me of the arrests Natapei was chairing a meeting of the 
pnme mmtster s Special Advisory Group in the heart of Port Vila (Pon Vila 
Presse ~I ~ugust. 2002). The officers were released on bail on 9 September 
2002: Junior pobce officers will carry out the investigation into 'Operation 
Procedure 2002' . The police and VMF officers who were suspended by the PSC 
have attached two caveats to any reconciliation process: they have demanded 
that ~eir case against the PSC be reopened and that their suspension be dropped 
(Tradmg Post 31 August 2002). Without their imprimatur the proposed 
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reconciliation ceremony will be meaningless; if the government concedes to 
their demands it would create a dangerous precedent, especially in the light of 
recent statements by Prime Minister Natapei that law and order would be 
enforced fairly and uniformly (Trading Post 31 August 2002). The president 
has disbanded the PSC under Michael Taun and replaced it with one under the 
chair of the director general of the Office of the Prime Minister, Jean Sese. 
Conclusion 
Scepticism over the long-term prospects for peace in Vanuatu is based on three 
interrelated issues: economic stagnation, regional trends, and fractious national 
politics. For over a decade, Vanuatu' s parliament has been effectively neutered 
by factional infighting and constitutional crises. The fragmentation of the VP in 
1991 undermined the only party capable of forming government in its own right. 
Since then, provision of services to the islands has become negligible as the 
relllllant parties engage in 'horse-trading' to form coalitions. This situation has 
shifted attention from long-term policy considerations to the immediate 
pragmatic concerns of brokering alliances. Whereas these forces have 
contributed to the breakdown of social and political order elsewhere in the 
Pacific - notably in the Solomon Islands (Kabutaulaka 2001: 1-3) - Vanuatu has 
remained peaceful, at least in part because of grass-roots indifference to such 
political spectacles. 
Throughout the 1990s the focus of politicians has shifted to internal forces as the 
major challenges to stability. The endemic problem of regime instability in 
Vanuatu has undermined durable policy formation and implementation, 
especially with relation to macro-economic policy, with visible impact on the 
viability of Vanuatu's economy. Recent events have shifted the focus from 
ethnic unrest as a possible source of instability to the role of the disciplined 
forces. The acquittal of monies owed to the police and VMF has been an 
enduring problem for the Vanuatu government, and has created subsidiary 
problems in its wake. 
The continued survival of the VP/UMP government has brought respite from the 
political instability of the 1990s, but key obstacles remain. Its prospects were 
significantly strengthened by' the conviction of Barak Sope. Despite Sope's 
preparedness to invoke a narrow vision of Vanuatu's national interest in 2001, 
his eventual arrest and conviction did not translate into civil unrest By his 
actions in this, Natapei signalled his intention to stamp out the sort of maverick 
leadership which Sope embodied, and hopefully lessen the potential for the 
economic mismanagement and corruption which Vanuatu has witnessed over 
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the past decade. Whether he will pursue his convictions within his own 
government is yet to be seen, but considering the precarious majority his 
g~vemment ~olds it. is perhaps unlikely. While UMP spokespeople have 
reiterated therr allegiance to the Vanua'aku Pati and publicly supported its 
p~li~y imperatives, key government members, including the deputy prime 
numster, have been targeted for investigation (Trading Post 19 May 2001). 
The relative calm of Natapei's term in office has been shadowed by the 
recurrent fear that each political event will trigger greater conflict. Over the past 
decade Vanuatu has managed to resolve its crises peacefully. However, events 
in Solomon Islands, Fiji and Papua New Guinea have encouraged the view of 
social breakdown in Vanuatu as inevitable. Senior government officials have 
consistently distanced Vanuatu from the social and political disintegration in 
neighbouring Melanesian countries and criticized regional media for their 
exaggerated and inaccurate reporting. Arthur Caulton reiterated these points 
when he accepted the mantel of acting police commissioner: 'Alphabetically, 
Vanuatu comes last, at the bottom of the group but this is not a disadvantage 
since we have taken our time over the last 22 years to learn from the mistakes of 
our .n~igh~our countries' (Trading Post 31 August 2002). The Natapei 
a~rustr~on has demonstrated its willingness to take on difficult targets and 
possibly nsk unrest to fulfil its core political aims. Whether Caul ton 's 
statements were pure rhetoric, intended to support these aims, or provide 
grounds for believing that Vanuatu will not become part of the so-called 'arc of 
instability', remains to be seen. 
Epilogue 
In. national elections in May 2002, the Vanua'aku Pati was initially returned 
with 14 seats, but attracted 3 independent candidates, giving it numerical 
superiority in the House over its coalition partner the UMP, which won 15 seats. 
The governing coalition thus has a majority of 32 of the 52 seats, and the VP 
retained the prime ministership. 
Paul . Ren Tari was not re-elected to the seat of Maewo in the May 2002 
elections: . he was defeated by Philip Boedoro (VP). He is currently seeking 
compensation for the charges brought against him by the Natapei government. 
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IN SPITE OF MR SPEIGHT? 
FIJI'S ROAD TO THE GENERAL ELECTIONS 
OF 200114 
Brij V. Lal 
George Speight's seizure of the Fiji parliament on 19 May 2000 now seems like 
a bad, nightmarish dream. Contrary to all provocations and incentives to 
violence, Fiji managed, but only just, to retrieve itself from the precipice of 
national disintegration. A year later, Speight was tried for treason, and is 
currently serving a seven-year sentence, though moves are afoot to have him 
pardoned. In August 2001 the country went to the polls, returning Laisenia 
Qarase's newly-formed Soqosoqo Duavata ni Levenivanua to government with 
thirty-two seats. The Labour Party, his main rival, won twenty-seven. The 
holding of the election was an important development, but instead of resolving 
the country's many deep-seated problems it compounded them. Qarase 
breached the constitution under which he was elected by refusing to have 
Chaudhry in a multi-party cabinet. The constitution provides that any political 
party with more than 10 per cent of seats in parliament is constitutionally 
entitled to be invited into cabinet. Under a formula provided for in the Korolevu 
Declaration, Qarase would have twelve cabinet positions and Chaudhry eight. 
Labour challenged the government's decision. The Fiji Court of Appeal ruled in 
Labour's favour, but the matter will be settled finally by the Supreme Court in 
early 2003. Meanwhile, Fiji remains marooned in the shallows. Whether the 
people of Fiji will accept the verdict of the court, whatever it might be, remains 
to be seen. 
The early days following the hijacking of the Fijian parliament were a time of 
great confusion and apprehension for the people of Fiji. After fifty-seven days, 
"For background to the coup sec Lal (2000a, 2000b). This paper draws from my personal archives on political 
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the hostages were released following an agreement (the Muanikau Accord) the 
military negotiated with the rebels. But the agreement was declared null and 
void when the rebels breached its terms. For its part, the military accepted the 
abrogation of the constitution, asked the then president, Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara, to step aside, which he did, and installed a civilian administration headed 
by the merchant banker and bureaucrat Laisenia Qarase. The interim 
administration took a number of early decisions designed to win public support 
and placate the international community. It announced a new Constitution 
Review Committee, headed by Fijian academic and nationalist hardliner, 
Professor Asesela Ravuvu, to review the 1997 constitution and recommend 
further measures to enhance Fijian control of the political process. The 
committee, disbanded in mid July, was boycotted by the lndo-Fijian community. 
The report has still not been released to the public. 
To win Fijian support, the interim administration outlined a 'Blueprint for 
Affirmative Action on Fijian Education'. The aim of the Blueprint was to 
'transform all Fijian schools into centres of cultural and educational excellence, 
facilitate and provide the quality education and training Fijian students need for 
their own individual development, and to adequately equip them for life in a 
vibrant and developing economy,' and to ' inculcate into Fijian parents the 
understanding that education is the key to success in life and to therefore place 
the education of their children highest on their list of priorities'. An affirmative 
program for indigenous Fijian education has been in place since independence in 
1970, but has failed to bear the desired fruit. Critics asked whether considering 
Fijian education in isolation, with the experience of the past failures in mind, 
would necessarily lead to the expected outcome. The interim administration, 
keen to collect Fijian votes, pressed on regardless, announcing other racially-
based affirmative action programs for the indigenous Fijian and Rotuman 
communities. 
With the interim administration in place, local and international pressure on Fiji 
mounted for a swift return to parliamentary democracy. At first the interim 
administration demurred, citing security reasons for delaying elections. But then 
followed a series of events which forced its hand in unexpected ways. The first, 
and perhaps the most important of them, was a court case challenging the 
abrogation of the 1997 constitution and the legality of the interim 
administration. The case was launched in the Lautoka High Court in August 
2000 before Justice Anthony Gates, by a displaced farmer from the violence-
ravaged southeastern Fiji, Chandrika Prasad. In his landmark ruling, handed 
down in November, Justice Gates found in Prasad's favour on all counts. The 
declaration of emergency by the president was invalid, and the revocation of the 
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constitution unconstitutional. The parliament, the judge said, was 'still in 
being', and he ordered the president to reconvene it 'at his discretion but as s~n 
as possible'. The judgement caught the interim administration by surpnse, 
partly because it had not expected it to be so far-reaching. 
As expected, the interim administration took the High Court decision to the 
Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court having being abolished by decree on the 
advice of the chief justice. The court, consisting of five overseas judges and 
presided over by Sir Maurice Casey of New Zealand, heard the appeal from 19 
to 22 May and handed down its decision on 1 March. It declared that the 1997 
constitution remained the supreme law of the land, and that the parliament had 
not been dissolved but prorogued for six months. But it ruled, against Justice 
Gates' decision, that the office of the president under the 1997 constitution had 
become vacant upon the resignation of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. 
It was landmark decision, broadcast live to the nation. In the 29-page ruling, the 
court carefully treated every objection raised by the interim administration. A 
major contention of the interim administration was that the 1997 constitution 
'did not adequately protect their [indigenous Fijian] interests' . The court 
concluded that the constitution was the result of a comprehensive process of 
consultation; that it contained iron-clad protections for fundamental Fijian 
interests and concerns, and that it could not be altered without the support of the 
indigenous Fijians themselves. Contrary to the interim administration' s claim, 
the 1997 constitution had 'received almost universal acclaim'; it cited Major 
General Sitiveni Rabuka' s praise for the document as 'an expression of 
confidence and hope in our collective future'. 
The interim administration had also argued strongly that the electoral system 
based on the alternative vote had 'proved extraordinarily complex, the results 
remarkably ambiguous and its merits as a tool for promoting ethnic cooperation 
highly questionable'. With another voting system, preferably the first-past-~e­
post, Fijian parties would have emerged victorious. The court ruled otherwise, 
after a close analysis of the voting figures. 'Whichever system had been used' . 
it concluded, 'the voting figures would have made the FLP [Fiji Labour Party] 
the largest individual party by a substantial margin'. The court also rejected the 
interim administration's claim that it was effectively in control of the country 
because the populace had acquiesced and the revolution had succeeded. The 
court was satisfied that freedom of speech and mobility were inhibited, with the 
application of emergency legislation hindering the expression ~f dissenting 
views. That is, the test of acquiescence had not been proved, the evidence to the 
contrary being overwhelming. 
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The court's decision caused commotion in the country. The military, which had 
given an undertaking to respect the decision, demurred. But the interim 
administration, to its credit, accepted the decision, as also did the Great Council 
of Chiefs, albeit with some reluctance. The interim administration would not 
resign, but committed itself to a general election at an unspecified date. That 
decision caused comment, but the deposed government itself was divided. 
Mahendra Chaudhry advised the president to dissolve a reconvened parliament 
and call for fresh elections. However, his deputy, and rival for leadership, Dr 
Tupeni Baba, wanted the president not to dissolve parliament but to call for the 
formation of a government of national unity from among the elected members of 
the old parliament. The rift between the two men, long simmering, was now in 
the open. When the president refused to heed the deposed prime minister's 
advice, the Citizen's Constitutional Forum (CCF), a non-government pro-
democracy movement, took the matter to court. In July, Justice Scott rejected 
their case, invoking the contentious concept of 'doctrine of necessity' to justify 
the president's extra-constitutional action, while the interim administration de-
registered the CCF for its alleged interference in politics. 
The performance of the judiciary, especially that of the chief justice, had been 
severely criticized long before Scott's decision. The Fiji Law Society passed a 
vote of no confidence in Sir Timoci Tuivaga and asked him to step ·aside, 
criticizing him for his unconstitutional advice to the president and for his role in 
drafting a decree abolishing the Supreme Court. The public skirmishes 
involving the judiciary and the Law Society damaged public confidence in an 
institution whose reputation for integrity and impartiality had, thus far, remained 
untainted. The various court challenges following the Court of Appeal decision 
generated more heat than light. After March 2001, the battle had shifted from 
the court of law to the court of public opinion, though some local lawyers 
thought otherwise. 
Meanwhile, once the date for the elections was announced, political parties 
began to prepare for the campaign. Chaos was the order of the day. The Labour 
Party fractured over Mahendra Chaudhry's leadership. Dr Baba attacked his 
former leader as a 'monster' , a dictator who had breached every principle of 
democratic governance. About to face the disciplinary committee of the party, 
and unable to topple Chaudhry in the caucus, Baba along with some of his close 
supporters resigned to form a new Fiji Labour Unity Party. The party won two 
seats in the 2001 election, though its leader, Dr Tupeni Baba, was unsuccessful, 
and subsequently resigned to accept an academic position at the University of 
Auckland. 
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For his part, Chaudhry welcomed the prospect of serving as ~rime minist:r 
again, dismaying some of his own supporters who wanted to him to ho!~ . ~1s 
political ambitions in check for a while, and inviting .the wr~th of the ~lJtan 
nationalists, who vowed never to accept him in the top Job agam. The Na~onal 
Federation Party, decimated at the polls in 1999, began to regroup, but without 
its longtime leader, Jai Ram Reddy, who announced his retirement from active 
politics. The party, once again, fared badly at the polls, winning only one seat 
(which was invalidated by the High Court; the Supreme Court later ruled that 
the High Court had acted wrongly, but was unable to override the decision 
because there is no appeal from the Court of Disputed Returns). Labour was the 
clear winner in the lndo-Fijian electorate. 
On the Fijian side, factionalism and fragmentation reached endemic pro~rtions, 
despite persistent efforts by the Fijian Methodist Church to pro~ote a dialogue 
of unity among Fijians. George Speight' s supporters on the island of Vanua 
Levu formed the Conservative Alliance, naming George Speight as its president 
in absentia. In the west, Apisai Tora, ever mercurial, launched yet another party, 
the Bai Kai Viti, which would compete for votes with the party he launched for 
the 1999 elections, the Party of National Unity. The Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa 
ni Taukei (SVT), launched by the Great Council of Chiefs in 1990, and the party 
in power throughout the 1990s, changed leaders in June 2001 , ve~eran po~tician 
Filipe Bole replacing the hardliner Ratu lnoke Kubuabola, but to httle avail - the 
party failed to win a single seat. In early 2002 Bole_ resigned fro~ t~e SVT to 
launch yet another Fijian party, the Fijian Democratic Party. La1s~ma Qarase'. 
the interim prime minister, launched his own party, the Soqosoq~ m Duavata .m 
Lewenivanua (SDL). The SOL emerged the clear winner, sending some of its 
rivals into extinction or forced exile. 
Fijians were disenchanted with all this fragmentation and splintering; they 
yearn for political unity, but that dream is as elusive as ever. The era of the rule 
of paramount chiefs, which began in the 1960s, ended with the de~arture ~r~m 
the national scene in 2000 of Ratu Sir Karnisese Mara. Younger chiefs aspmng 
for national office are too deeply embroiled in provincial and local politics to 
carve out a national niche for themselves. At the same time, their role in 
national politics is challenged by Fijians of non-chiefly rank. Furthermore, 
election from traditional provincial boundaries of twenty-three Fijian seats 
accentuates provincial and regional sentiments at the expense of forging 
overarching national loyalties. On the Indo-Fijian side, too, the departure of the 
best and the brightest to other countries has had a significant negative impact on 
the calibre of leaders available to the community. 
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As it awaits the outcome of the court case before the Supreme Court, expected 
sometime next year, the Qarase government has once again opened up debate 
about the relevance of democracy to Fiji. Its institutions and practices, it says, 
are inimical to Fijian interests, and antithetical to the social ethos of a society 
based on hierarchy and privilege. Many in government and in the wider Fijian 
community argue that Fiji should always have an indigenous Fijian as head of 
government. That call is emotionally appealing but fraught. For the question is 
not whether to have a Fijian head of government, but which Fijian will be 
acceptable to a militant Fijian minority at a particular point. Recent Fijian 
history is replete with examples of Fijians turned out of office by Fijians 
themselves. They include Raru Sir Kamisese Mara and Major General Sitiveni 
Rabuka. Fijian soldiers mutinied against their commander Frank Bainimarama. 
And George Speight (who claims to be a Fijian of sorts) has been put behind 
bars by Fijians who have benefited from his treasonous action. · 
The prime minister has also floated the idea that land ownership should be 
taken into account in determining the structure of executive power. Fijians now 
own 90 per cent of all land in Fiji, and that fact, he asserts, should be reflected in 
the composition of parliament. This anachronistic proposal, sure to be rejected 
by the international community, raises another issue: how will those provinces, 
such as Ba, which have more land than, say, the maritime provinces, be 
accommodated in a system founded on the logic of property-based 
representation? Qarase has also expressed personal support for a completely 
race-based electoral system, arguing that Fijians and lndo-Fijians have always 
voted on racial lines. While that is true, it raises questions about the apparent 
Fijian and Indo-Fijian attachment to their primordial roots when people in many 
developed and developing multi-ethnic societies are able to cross ethnic and 
cultural boundaries with ease. The answer is simple, but those in power are not 
prepared to countenance it: Fiji has always had a race-based electoral system 
which encourages and rewards ethnic attachments. If we create an electoral 
system based on race, people will vote along racial lines. 
There are other issues, too, which provoke debate. The government has 
embarked on a deeply contested race-based affirmative action policy in favour 
of the indigenous Fijians on the assumption that they alone are in need of special 
assistance. Critics cite independent research to argue that poverty cuts across 
ethnic lines and that other communities also need help in specific areas. In 
parliament, government ministers vilify the lndo-Fijian community ('wild 
weeds', in the words of Social Welfare Minister Asenaca Caucau) and call for 
the abolition of public holidays for Hindu and Muslim festivals (Senator 
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Bulanauca), without being reprimanded by the prime minister for their hurtful 
comments. Meanwhile, the plight of those whose leases have not been r~newed, 
and who have been forced to look for alternative employment, contmues to 
worsen. Two years after the Speight saga, fundamental social and political 
questions about the nature and purpose of politics in Fiji remain unresolved. 
61 
ISLANDS OF NEGLECT 
Benjamin Reilly 
Weak governance, widespread corruption, economic mismanagement, nsmg 
crime, and violent ethnic conflicts are undermining the stability of the island 
nations of the South Pacific. As some countries assume the status of Somalia-
like 'failed states', the formerly benign South Pacific islands represent a 
growing threat to regional security. 
This process has been hastened by the lack of attention to the region's problems 
by traditional powers like the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Now, 
rising Asian powers like China and Taiwan - which have important diplomatic, 
economic and strategic interests in the region - are moving to fill the vacuum 
created by the weakness of the region's states and their debilitating internal 
conflicts. 
The facts of these internal conflicts are grim. Over the past year, there has been 
a coup in Fiji, followed two weeks later by the overthrow, at gunpoint, of the 
Solomon Islands government and a bloody civil war between rival ethnic 
militias. There has also been insubordination by the disciplined forces in 
Vanuatu, the assassination of a cabinet minister in Samoa, and growing criminal 
influence in 'rnicrostates' like Nauru and Tuvalu. In March 2001 the region's 
largest country, Papua New Guinea, saw a short-lived uprising by elements of 
the Defence Force against their own government as part of a pay dispute. 
The region is also mired in sub-standard economic performance. In fact, the 
South Pacific is on a par with sub-Saharan Africa in its per capita GDP, literacy 
and schooling rates, public health statistics and, ominously, in its lack of 
economic opportunity for young job seekers. What underlying forces are 
driving this 'Africanization' of the South Pacific region? 
Civil-military relations 
Growing tensions between civilian governments and their annies across the 
region - exemplified by last year's events in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, and 
the recent military insurrection in Papua New Guinea - is problem number one. 
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Most Pacific island countries do not have a standing anny. But those that do are 
finding it increasingly difficult to keep military forces under civilian rule. In 
Fiji, for example, members of the armed forces actively conspired with criminal 
groups last year to overthrow the elected government they were duty-bound to 
protect. 
Increasing military insubordination over pay claims and industrial matters is 
another problem. This first came to prominence in Vanuatu two years ago, 
when members of the country's Mobile Force abducted a cabinet minister over a 
pay dispute. In March, this practice spread to Papua New Guinea, where 
elements of the anny rebelled over attempts to downsize the country's unwieldy 
and inefficient military. 
In all cases, there are now clear questions as to the degree of civilian control 
over the military. In Africa, the worst abuses of civilian populations have been 
performed by their own annies. This grim scenario is becoming increasingly 
possible in the Pacific as well. 
Small arms proliferation 
Until recently, the South Pacific's geographic isolation helped protect it from the 
abundant supply of cheap light weapons that have fuelled African conflicts for 
decades. But there are other ways in which guns can be placed in the hands of 
rebel forces, as was shown by the Fiji coup in May last year. Utilizing arms 
stolen from military depots, coup-leader George Speight and his supporters -
including members of the Fijian army's Special Forces Unit - amassed an 
extraordinary armory of firepower, taking the government hostage and crippling, 
perhaps permanently, Fiji's nascent democracy. Two weeks later, in the 
Solomon Islands, Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu was forced to resign at 
gunpoint after anned rebels from the Malaitan Eagle Force seized the capital. 
There, it was the police force (whose members are overwhelmingly Malaitan), 
that supplied the weapons. 
In each case, the key has been access to weapons, mostly stolen from military or 
police annouries. Aggrieved groups have discovered the truth of Chairman 
Mao's adage that power grows out of the barrel of a gun. As a result, both Fiji 
and the Solomons today have governments installed by the bullet, not the ballot. 
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Group inequality and identity politics 
A third element driving conflicts in the South Pacific is ethnic identities and 
inequalities, combined with the struggle for control of natural resources. 
Tensions over land ownership are especially important. In some countries, 
hostilities between indigenous populations and perceived 'settler' groups - such 
as Indians in Fiji - are partly driven by deep-rooted concerns about land rights. 
But elsewhere, many conflicts are between rival tribes or clan groupings - as in 
the Solomon Islands, where movements of people from the island of Malaita to 
the main island of Guadalcanal is a root cause of the current civil war. 
Perceptions of ethnic group inequality have also proved to be a potent 
mobilizing force. In the long-running Bougainville war, and again more 
recently in the Solomon Islands, ethnic tensions between different areas have 
been ruthlessly exploited by unscrupulous leaders. Many 'ethnic' conflicts are, 
in reality, power struggles over the control of resources and control of the state. 
But the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of the South Pacific makes identity issues 
a potent mobilizing force. It is these divisions - between language group, clan, 
and region - that are increasingly coming to the fore as sources of ethnic 
conflict. 
Brittle governance 
A fourth element in the Africanization of the region is the increasing weakness 
of basic institutions of representative government. As in Africa, the democratic 
institutions of most South Pacific states were transferred from colonial powers. 
Despite cases like Papua New Guinea, where a local body drew up the 
independence constitution, these institutions invariably drew on overseas 
experience rather than being designed for the newly-independent countries 
themselves. The Westminster parliamentary model is particularly prevalent, due 
to the high proportion of South Pacific states colonized by Britain. But in 
contrast to the Westminster ideal of a stable two-party system, most political 
parties in the South Pacific have proved to be weak, fragmented and incapable 
of generating stable government. 
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The region's largest and most important state, Papua New Guinea, has been 
plagued since independence by parliamentary votes of no confidence, with more 
changes of government on the floor of parliament than at elections. At the l 997 
elections independent candidates, mostly representing local clan groups, won a 
majority of the total vote, although the average support level of elected 
candidates was just 19 per cent of the vote. The situation in the Solomon Islands 
is even more extreme. 
The result is that elections are a contest to see whose extended family and clan 
groups can gain enough votes to get elected. Under the first-past-the-post 
systems used in the region, candidates do not need to gain widespread support, 
and elections are often won with remarkably low vote totals. As a result, most 
elected governments represent only a small fraction of their population. 
China rising 
A final - and most serious - aspect of the region's Africanization is the 
increasing weakness of the region's states, and their growing search for external 
support. Many Pacific states are turning to new benefactors and supporters, as 
traditional powers like Australia, New Zealand and the United States 
increasingly lose interest in the region and its problems. As a result, the South 
Pacific is undergoing a geopolitical shift away from the West and towards Asia. 
Along with Japan, China and Taiwan have been particularly prominent in 
exploiting this shift. Both have offered financial support to island governments, 
building parliamentary complexes and government offices, in return for votes of 
support at the UN. 
China has also forged new defence ties with Papua New Guinea and other 
governments, and in 1997 established a military satellite-tracking facility on the 
Micronesian island of Kiribati. Taiwan has also been an active player in the 
region, particularly in the Solomon Islands, which grants diplomatic recognition 
to Taiwan over China in return for large cash subsidies. 
As the Africanization of the South Pacific continues, weak and unstable regional 
governments will increasingly seek this kind of external support. This will have 
long-term strategic consequences, not just for the island state themselves but for 
the entire Asia-Pacific region. 
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